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Coase and the Courts: Economics for
the Common Man
Barbara White*
INTRODUCTION

The arguments collectively known as the Coase Theorem were first
presented by R.H. Coase, an economist,l in his 1960 paper entitled The
Problem of Social Cost. 2 Based on the conclusions of that "theorem,"3 Coase
criticizes the prevailing judicial policy of resolving legal disputes on the
basis that businesses should "internalize" costs, that is, bear the indirect
social costs associated with the production of goods and services.4 He argues
the automatic application of this internalization policy often leads to
economic inefficiency rather than to the maximization of efficiency, a goal
which the judicial policy purports to promote. As an alternative, Coase
claims that a different rule, one based on maximizing the total product of
the parties to the dispute, would lead society closer to economic efficiency.s
Over the last twenty-five years, the Coase Theorem as well as Coase's
policy recommendation (referred to here as the total product rule) have
fostered considerable debate both in economics and legal literature. One
controversy focuses on whether the Coase Theorem itself is valid; some
critics claim that Coase's arguments are analytically faulty.6 Another major
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center, previously Visiting
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin at Madison and Assistant Professor
of Economics, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A. Mathematics, Hunter College
(1969); Ph.D. Economics, Cornell University (1980); J.D. State University of New York at
Buffalo (1985). The author thanks Robin Curtis, University of Houston Law Center, Class of
1987, for her invaluable efforts during her tenure as my research assistant.
1. Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics Emeritus and Senior Fellow in Law and
Economics, University of Chicago.
2. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
3. Coase's conclusions are drawn from a conjecture argued by example and therefore do
not technically constitute a theorem, i.e., an assertion formed so that it can be rigorously
proved or disproved. This is not to say that others have not attempted a more formal treatment
of his conjecture. See infra note 6. Although Coase never refers to a "theorem" in his article,
the appellation given to his discussion has been used by others. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & ApPLICATION 477-80 (4th ed. 1982) (explaining Coase's argument);
Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other than for Profit or Sale
Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins cases, 28
ST LoUIS U.L.]. 647, 673-81 (1984) (Coase Theorem used to argue that tax or subsidy system
of video cassette recorders and their home use would result in misallocation of resources). This
Article follows the convention of calling Coase's conclusions a "theorem."
4. Coase, supra note 2, at 1-2.
5.Id. at 34.
6. See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975);
Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980); Kelman, Choice
and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 769; Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981). For rigorous economic analyses questioning the validity
of the Coase Theorem, see Aivazian & Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. &
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point of controversy is a philosophical one. Because Coase's total product
rule often operates to redistribute wealth from the less advantaged to the
more advantaged, other critics assert that economic analysis itself is
inconsistent with basic principles of fairness and equity and thus offers
nothing to judicial decisionmaking. 7
Despite these continuing disputes in the scholarly community over the
validity and meaningfulness of Coase's approach (or perhaps because of
these debates), the courts show a growing interest in Coase's arguments. s
Furthermore, the judicial use of economic analysis in general is expanding,
a trend fostered in part by law and economics programs in law schools, and
by institutes that train judges and lawyers in the use of economic reasoning. 9 Therefore economic analysis will likely playa growing role in legal
decision making, and Coase will be an important influence in this development.
Although a plethora of articles consider the validity of Coase's theorem and the philosophical relevance of economic analysis in general,
commentators have paid little attention to evaluating the economic correctness of Coase's policy recommendation. lO In other words, assuming that the
ECC)N. 175 (1981); Bramhall & Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Payments, 2 WATER
RESOURGES RE3. 615 (1966); Kamien, Schwartz & Dolbear, Asymmetry Between Bribes and Charges,
2 WATER RESOURCES REs. 147 (1966); Tybout, Pricing Pollution and Other Negative Externalities,
3 BELL]. EGON. & MGMT. SCI. 252 (1972).
7. For in;tance, Mark Kelman comments:
The real substantive vision of the Coase Theorem, its real cultural "contribution," is
to a partIcular world picture that seems to me both a distorted "description" and a
horrifying covert ideal. Once we can convince ourselves that we can picture people
evaluating end-states abstracted from their social definition and that we can aspire
only to create social institutions that then passively respond to these mysterious
end-state judgments, we have moved much too far in the direction of resignation,
despairing impotence, and (dare I say it) nihilistic skepticism about our capacity to
grow.
Kelman, Com.nent on Hoffman and Spitzer's E.xperimental Law and Economics, 85 COLUM. L.
REV, 1037, 1047 (1985). In a similiar vein, Lincoln Caplan reports:
These critics say the law and economics movement ignores the complexity of human
behavior in suggesting that society's main purpose is to maximize wealth. Even if that
were true, say the critics, elevating this aspect of human behavior to the status of a
legal pril1ciple promotes selfishness, not the orderly society that law seeks to
encourage.
Caplan, Does good economics make good UlW? [sicl, CALIF. LAw., May 1985, at 28, 30.
8. Since Coase's article, The Problem of Soci1ll Cost, was published in 1960, there have been
19 opinions citing the article. Seventeen of the opinions are discussed in part III of this Article.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-269. The method used for discovering these opinions
is discussed infra note 125.
Casual exainination of the years in which these opinions were written reveals that the
frequency with which courts cite to Coase is increasing with time. Two opinions cite The
Problem of SOCi7l Cost in the first ten years after its publication (through 1970), SL,,{ opinions cite
it in the next ten years (through 1980), and ten opinions cite it in the six years from 1980 to
the time of this study.
9. The University of Chicago, the University of Miami, and Emory Uniyersity are some of
the institutions noted for providing special programs for the study oflaw and economics. The
Federal Judicial Center also now offers judges a one-week program patterned after the ones
offered to juriSts at the University of Miami and Emory University.
10. See R. POSNf.R, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 35 n.l (2d ed. 1977) ("The article makes ...
other important points, which are sometimes overlooked, relating to the case in which the costs
of transfcrrinl~ the property rights is so high that a voluntary transfer is not feasible."). The
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Coase Theorem is valid, it is still questionable whether the application of
Coase's total product rule does indeed promote greater economic efficiency.
In this Article, I demonstrate that the application of the total product
rule does not promote economic efficiency any more than the prevailing
judicial policies that incorporate the traditional principles of fairness and
equity.ll In fact, I show that Coase's total product rule serves primarily as
a mechanism for redistributing wealth. I2 These efficiency and distributive
implications also raise constitutional concerns relating to the taking of
private property.I3 Although Coase implicitly claims that his approach does
not contain value choices, an analysis of his methodology indicates that his
theory does indeed mask one. I4
Many writers suggest that economic analysis is itself so steeped in the
values of Coase and his followers (the most notable of whom is Judge
Richard Posner) that one cannot separate the two; thus these writers argue
against the use of any economic reasoning in the resolution of disputes. 15
Their perception is, however, erroneous. I6 To the contrary, I will discuss
the way value choices can and should be separated from economic
reasoningP Economic analysis by itself, unencumbered by value choices,
can be an effective aid in analyzing the issues presented in legal disputes,
clarifying when a value choice must be made, and identifying what choices
are available.
failure to discuss Coase's policy recommendation is often due to a failure to recognize that his
policy is to serve when the conclusions of the theorem de not hold. Professor Farber, for
example, appears to make this mistake when he argues that the problem with the Coase
Theorem is that it has no real world applicability. See Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70
MINN. L. REv. 917, 918-20 (1986). His explanation, however, intuitively makes the necessary
distinction by providing a novel insight'into "transactions costs," a concern to which Coase's
policy recommendation is addressed. For a brief description of Farber's point and for a
discussion of transactions costs, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 58-68.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 69-83.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 84-102.
14. See infra te.xt accompanying notes 103-18.
15. See Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52
S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 678-98 (1979). As Lincoln Caplan notes:
Stressing the uncertainties of cost-benefit calculations, the critics contend that "law
and economics" uses the guise of "science" to justify substituting the value judgments
of free-market economics for those of the law. In their most critical moments, they
accuse Posner, especially, of cloaking radical, right-wing political opinions in the
mantle of "law and economics."
Caplan, supra note 7, at 30.
16. Even though this perception is erroneous, it is not without cause. See, e.g., Cohen,
Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1117 (1985). Cohen, a J.D. and Ph.D. (Economics) candidate at University of Pennsylvania,
critically evaluates the first three years of Posner's tenure as judge. Cohen finds'that Posner
not only uses economic analysis incorrectly, inappropriately, and incompletely, see id. at
1150-66, but he finds that Posner selectively uses it primarily to support Posner's conservative
ideology, see id. at 1151. Since Posner is the most widely known, see, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 4,
1986, at 1, col. 1, and probably the most widely read jurist who actively advocates the use of
economic reasoning in resolving legal issues-his ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3rd. ed.
1986)(lst ed. 1973) was the first of its kind-it is not surprising that Posner's demonstration of
the use of economic analysis in law has become synonymous with economic reasoning itself.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 119-269.
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Indeed, case analyses of the opinions in which judges cite Coase's
al'ticle 18 demonstrate that courts intuitively recognize this separation of
economic analysis and value choices. Even when the courts appear to think
that their decisions are economically determined, further probing shows
that broader social policies are involved. This observation holds true even
for Judge Posner, who is viewed as the leading exponent of economic
dcterminhm in legal decisionmaking.

1.

THE ROAD TO ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

A.

Pigouvian Economics

The prevailing judicial philosophy for resolving legal disputes arising
from the infliction of harm by the production of goods and services
requires that businesses absorb all the costs associated with production. 19
While this approach is not the sole determinant of the results in many cases,
the courts nonetheless use it as a factor in deciding liability. This judicial
approach found support in the economic principle of internalization
espoused by A.C. Pigou, a leading early twentieth century economist. 20
Pigou argues that if firms did not pay for all the costs associated with
their production, the market prices for their goods would not reflect the
actual cost to society of the use of its resources. As a result, some goods
would be underpriced while other goods would be overpriced. For example, suppose that iIi the course of production a firm pollutes an adjacent
river which has the effect of increasing the costs of production to a farmer
downstream. If the firm is not forced to pay for those increased costs, then
the farmer must absorb them. Due to these higher costs the farmer will
have to charge higher prices in order to produce the same level of output
as he did before the pollution. Because of these higher prices, however,
consumers will purchase less of the farmer's goods than they did previously.
A new equilibrium for the farmer can be achieved only at higher prices and
lower levels of production. At the same time, since the firm is not required
to absorb its pollution costs, it will have lower costs of production and thus
will be able to charge lower prices to produce the same level of output.
Because of these lower prices consumers are willing to purchase more of
the firm's goods. The firm's equilibrium will consist of lower prices and
greater omput when it does not pay for the pollution effects as compared
with when it does. 21
Pigou characterizes this phenomenon as a distortion of the marketplace and argues that this distortion is economically inefficient. He reasons
that the value to the consumers of the firm's additional goods is less than its
true costs, that is, the price the consumer is willing to pay is less than the
18. See id.
19. This philosophy is most easily seen in the law of nuisance. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
AND KEETON ON THE Lw{ OF TORTS 629 (5th cd. 1984) ("This is simply a decision that
the harm thus intentionally inflicted should be regarded as a cost of doing the kind of business
in which the defendant is engaged.").
:20. A. Pwou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
21. See infra note 22 for a graphical exposition of these arguments.
PRO~SER
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cost of using society's resources to produce them. Similarly, the value of the
farm output that is no longer produced exceeds the true cost savings from
not producing it, that is, the price the consumer is willing to pay for the
additional products is greater than the cost to society in resources to
produce them. 22 As a result, society'S total utility, that is, the measure of
22. Pigou's arguments are captured in the graphs, displayed below, that compare the
market equilibrium when the firm bears the pollution cost with the market equilibrium when
the farmer bears the cost. The demand curve for each product (labeled D) reflects the quantity
of each product consumers are willing to purchase at various prices. The supply curve reflects
the quantity of goods each producer (the firm and the farmer) is willing to supply at various
prices. Each supply curve is based on the costs of producing various quantities of the respective
product. Obviously, the supply curve shifts up (i.e., the producer will demand higher prices for
each quantity of output) if the producer bears the pollution costs on top of his other costs, and
vice versa, if the producer does not.
price

price

P

pc.

9.

5.

P

5,

P

c.

9'

0

c,

c,

crops

9'

9'

goods
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Farmer

FIGURE 1

EI on the two graphs reflects the market equilibrium of the goods when the firm bears the
costs of its pollution. In that instance, the farmer produces CI quantity of crops selling them
at price Pel The firm produces gl quantity of goods selling them at price PgI.
If the farmer bears the cost of the pollution, his supply curve shifts up while the firm's
supply curve shifts down. E2 on the two graphs reflects the resulting market equilibrium in
that instance indicating the corresponding quantity and price for each good.
Pigou's analysis measures the welfare loss resulting from the failure to force the firm to
internalize its pollution cost by measuring the loss in welfare in moving from EI to E2 in each
market. A standard economics technique for measuring this loss graphically is the consumer
surplus (or more specifically the sum of consumer plus producer surplus) approach. See H.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 263-68, 276-84 (2d ed. 1984). This approach measures social
welfare by the area under the demand curve subtracting the area under the supply curve. This
sum captures the value to the consumers of the goods (reflected in their willingness to pay for
the goods-i.e., the area under their demand curve) minus the cost to society of producing the
good (the area under the supply curve). Thus, the sum is a measure of the increase in
consumer welfare as a result of producing the goods.
Specifically for the firm-farmer example, in the farmer's market as a result of the drop in
production from CI to C2, the utility lost is measured by trapezoid E2 EICIC2; the resource saved
is measured by FEICIC2- The net social loss equals the difference, i.e., triangle E2FE I. In the
firm's market, as a result of the expansion of goods from gl to g2, the utility
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satisfaction consumers derive from goods, is reduced. Pigou argues that this
reduction in satisfaction is economically inefficient.23
At the heart of Pigouvian analysis is the unstated assumption that
what com titutes the true cost of production is known. Pigou implicitly
assumes that the costs of pollution should be borne by the firm. This
assumption is not unreasonable given that Pigou wrote in the context of an
emerging industrialization intruding upon agrarian interests.24 Looking
neutrally at the firm-farmer example, however, uncovers no inherent
reason to conclude that the firm's true cost includes the pollution effects on
the farmer's production downstream. Certainly, if the farmer were not
there, those costs would not exist. 25 The determination of the true costs
depends on who has the entitlement, that is, who has the right to the use of
the river. Only when that right is assigned does the true cost become
known. The question of the assignment of the right is a legal question, one
which can be resolved only by weighing those factors typically considered in
gained is trapezoid E IE2g2g 1 while the increased resource use is glg2GEI' The net loss equals
triangle GE2 EI which when added to the loss in the farmer's market represents a decline in
social welfare (and therefore is inefficient).
This analy,is, however, has a number of problems. At a simple level, there is considerable
double·counting. For example, the increased pollution costs resulting from the expansion of
the firm's production from gl to g2 is measured avice, once in the additional pollution costs the
firm does no: pay for and once in the reduction in output by the farmer from having to bear
the pollution costs. This can be remedied easily by merely compaling the total consumer
surplus under EI with the total consumer surplus under E2' A priori, however, one cannot tell
without empirical data which situation, EI or E2 , will result in a larger consumer surplus,
leaving it ambiguous as to who should be a!signed pollution costs.
More fundamentally though, even without the ambiguities, the consumer surplus approach
har. implicit in it value assumptions about the relative worth of different human beings. In
particular, it tends to weigh wealthier people more heavily in the measure of social welfare
than poorer people. See H. VARIAN, supra, at 206-09. At the heart of the problems of the
consumer sUfplus approach is the difficulty of isolating the wealth distribution implications
from the economic efficiency analysis. This difficulty is also a major conc{!rn of this Article.
This problem is endemic to economic analysis and has been made more obscure by much of
the writing in the legal arena by law and economics scholars. For an economic discussion of
these particular problems in consumer surplus analysis, see generally Willig, Consumer's Surplus
Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 589 (1976). For recent efforts to grapple with the
distributional implications of economic efficiency analysis, see the references cited infra notes
69, 108 & 11 B. Of course, the reader should not infer that Pigouvian analysis in particular is
imhued with these problems. The Coasian approach is equally steeped in this difficulty, if not
even more sc. See infra text accompanying notes 69-83, 103-113.
23. Economists generally agree that a lowering of society's total utility is a result of
economic ineFficiency. For a discussion of the technical meaning of economic inefficiency, see
infra note 33 and accompanying text.
For a more in-depth understanding of market distortion, true cost, and total utility, see A.
AsIHAKOPuLm, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC THEORY: MICROECONOMICS 434-36 (1978).
24. Although policies existed that limited these liabilities, see 31 S. HALsBURY, THE L\ws OF
ENGLAND 474-75 (Lord Simons 3d ed. 1960) (railroad liability limited by statute), the
underlying philosophy placed responsibility on the industrial enterprise. See W. PROSSER & W.
KEI:TON, SUpTll note 19, at 629.
25. Of course, in reality, pollution provides a wide variety of social costs other than the
specific harm to the farmer downstream. However, in order to facilitate the reader's
understanding of the nuances of externalities (i.e., the noninternalized costs of production,
such as pollution), I avoid the analytic complications introduced by multi-party victims and
foclls solely on the case when there is, at most, one party affected by the externality.
Therefore, I assume (as economists are wont to do) that the impact of the pollution is limited
to one party.
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assigning property rights. While those factors may include economic
considerations, that is not the same as economic considerations being
dispositive. Pigou, however, implicitly assumes, without considering possible alternatives, that the entitlement belongs to the farmer. Thus, for
Pigou, the issue as to how to determine true costs never arises.

B.

Coase's Critique

Coase points to this latent assumption buried in Pigou's approach. 26
He argues that Pigou made it appear as if economic reasoning dictated the
assignment of property rights, and thus who should bear the indirect social
costs.27 Coase argues that economic analysis does not lead inexorably to the
choice of one assignment over the other. Coase contends that, to the
contrary, economic analysis tells us that it is irrelevant to whom the
property assignment is made. Ultimately no party will adjust production
levels to accomodate obligations to bear the indirect costs. Disagreeing with
Pigouvian analysis, Coase claims to prove that no market distortion occurs,
with or without internalization, and therefore no economic efficiency issues
ensue. 28
Coase argues that market distortions do not exist because all parties
would maintain the same level of production regardless of which party is
forced to bear the indirect costs. 29 No matter who is assigned the right, the
party without the right will pay the other party to restrain the exercise of
that right. Furthermore, either party will pay just enough so that the output
of goods and pollution by both parties will be the same regardless of who
pays. For example, suppose a paper mill pollutes a river in proportion to its
level of paper production. Suppose further that the level of crop production of a downstream crop farmer varies with the level of pollution in the
river. If the firm bears liability for pollution costs, the firm will offer to
compensate the farmer for any crop damage in exchange for permission to
pollute to some degree, so long as the necessary compensation is less than
the value of the increased paper production to the firm. Under such
circumstances, the farmer should agree to accept the offer since he is fully
compensated for any crop loss. Conversely, under the same scenario, if the
farmer must bear the pollution costs, the farmer will pay the firm to restrain
its pollution by compensating the firm for the reduction in its output, so
long as the necessary compensation to the firm is less than the increased
value of the crops that results from the restrained pollution. Given that one
or the other party (i.e., firm or farmer) must bear the costs of pollution,
Coase argues that the output of each party will remain the same, regardless
of who bears the costs.30 According to Coase, the optimal output for both
26. Coase, supra note 2, at 34; see also id. at 12-15 (illustrating this assumption).
27./d. at 13, 28-34.
28. /d. at 1-8.
29. [d. at 6, 8.
30. For a numerical example that elucidates his point, see infra note 31. Probably the most
important point that tends to escape readers and writers in the area is that the optimal output
for each of the two parties, given the presence of a pollution problem. indeed differs from the
optimal output for each party alone if the party did not have a pollution problem with which
to contend. (Even Coase fails to distinguish between these differing optimal states in his
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parties is determined by the relative market values of the parties' products.
values not affected by the assignment of liability.3!
numerical example to support the total product rule. See infra note 50.) This change in the
optimal level of production that results from the introduction of pollution is not to be confused
with Coase'~ assertions that the optimal level of production remains unchanged by liability
as~ignment. Coase's argument is that once the parties must operate within the framework of
pollution, e~,ch party's optimal output level in that framewrrrk is not affected by which party is
the one leg;tlly obligated to bear the pollution costs. For a discussion of the importance of
distinguishing between economic conditions before and after the introduction of pollution, see
Baker, Startmg Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 939, 950-53 (1981).
31. See Coase, supra note 2, at 6, 8. The following numerical example, a modification of
Coase'g own, see id. at 3-6, should clarify Coase's arguments.
Assume the farmer's acre adjacent to the river produces 20 bushels of crops when there is
no pollution. Assume that the cost of producing those crops is $10 and that the crops sell at
$1 per bushel. This yields the fanner a revenue of $20 and a profit of $10.
Assume that the paper mill sells its output at $5 per pound and that its costs of production
for different levelq of output (absent any pollution considerations) are as indicated in Table 1.
The total profits are calculated by subtracting costs of production from revenue (pounds
multiplied by $5).
Table I Paper
Total Profit
Revenues
Costs
Pounds
0
0
0
0
$ 4
1
$ 1
$ 5
$ 7
2
$10
$ 3
3
$15
$ 6
S9
$10
$20
$10
4
$10
5
$25
S15
$21
$ 9
6
$30
Clearly, abgcnt any pollution considerations, the ma.ximum possible profit is $10, achievable by
producing e,ther 4 or 5 pounds of paper. For convenience, assume the firm would produce 4
pounds.
The impact of pollution can then be analyzed by demonstrating what happens to the
farmer's crops when the paper mill is operating upstream. Assume that the level of crop
damage depends on the number of pounds of paper (and therefore the quantity of pollution)
produced, a'l represented in Table II.
Table II
Crops
Paper
Change
Amount of
in Revenues
Total
Change in
Bushels
(Damage)
Protit
Remaining
Pounds
Profit
20
0
0
I
4
19
4
I
3
17
2
7
2
3
14
3
9
2
4
10
I
10
4
5
10
0
5
5
5
-I
0
0
9
If the paper mill closed down, the farmer's acre would still produce 20 bushels of crops; if
the mill produced 3 pounds of paper, 6 bushels of crops would be destroyed, leaving 14
bushel> for ;ale, and if 5 pounds of paper were produced, 15 bushels would be destroyed
leaving 5 btcshels for sale. The legal issue is who bears the pollution cost: the firm or the
farmer? Co:tse aS5erts that from an economk perspective it does not matter because the
parties' production decision in response to the pollution will be the same regardless of how the
court decides.
To unden-tand Coase's argument, first compare the two parties' output decision when the
firm is held liable with their decision when the farmer bears the cost (i.e., the firm is found not
liable). If the firm is liable it must compensate the farmer with $1 for every bushel lost. The
firm examir,cs the net impact of e.xpanding its production one pound at a time. If the
additional pound adds more in increased profit than in increased liability the firm will expand
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Having argued that no market distortion can occur, Coase also claims
that his analysis demonstrates that the parties themselves, through negotiations, would automatically reach the economically efficient level of outpUt. 32 By definition, society achieves economic efficiency when it reaches a
state in which no further redistribution of resources and goods can be made
that will make one individual better off without making another individual
worse off.33 Since both the farmer and the firm have attained their optimal
profit maximizing level of output, given the existence of pollution, neither
one can improve its own situation without making the other worse off.
Coase reasons that since the parties cannot further redistribute between
themselves in order to make an unambiguous improvement, they therefore
also have made an unambiguous improvement for society as a whole. 34 In
other words, Coase concludes that because the parties have satisfied the
criterion of economic efficiency between themselves (that is, they have each
achieved their optimal output levels given the presence of the other), they
have, as a consequence, brought society closer to economic efficiency.
its production. For example, the firm should increase its output at least from 0 to 1, because
it will gain $4 in profits and pay only $1 in liability, and from 1 to 2 ($3 of added profit and
only $2 added liability). It should not e.xpand production, however, from 2 to 3 pounds
because there the added profits ($2) are less than the added liability ($3). Thus, the optimal
output decision for the firm is to produce 2 pounds of paper, leaving the farmer with 17
bushels of crops to sell.
If the farmer must bear the cost of pollution (i.e., the firm is found not liable), then the
farmer must consider whether it is worthwhile to pay the firm to restrain its production. If the
farmer does not pay anything, the firm's optimal output, since it is not liable for the pollution,
is 4 pounds for $10 profit-the output it would choose absent pollution considerations. In
order to reduce the firm's planned output (and thereby its pollution), the 'farmer must pay the
forgone profit from each pound of output the firm does not produce. The farmer compares
this payment with the increased revenue he would receive from the resulting increase in the
remaining crops. If the increased revenue from a pound reduction exceeds the payment for
the forgone profit, the farmer will pay the firm to reduce its planned output. Thus, in the case
here, the farmer will pay the firm to reduce its output from 4 to 3 since the farmer has to pay
the firm $1 and the farmer's revenues increase, as a l'esuIt, by $4. Similarly, the farmer is
willing to pay the firm the necessary $2 to reduce its output from 3 to 2, since the farmer's
increased crops yield $3 of additional revenue. The farmer, however, will not be willing to pay
the firm to reduce its output to 1 because the necessary payment of $3 exceeds the $2 value
of the increased crops. Thus, the optimal decision for the farmer is to let the firm produce 2
units of output leaving the farmer with 17 bushels to sell. This is exacdy the same outcome as
in the scenario where the firm was held liable, which is Coase's assertion.
32.ld. at 6.
33. This defmition of economic efficiency is commonly referred to as satisfying the
conditions for Pareto Optimality. Intuitively, one can understand the desirability of this
condition by considering the implications of not satisfying it. If the condition was not satisfied,
then the current distribution of goods and resources is such that it is possible to redistribute
those goods so as to make at least one person better off while no one else is made any worse
off. Clearly an improvement in the well-being of one member of society at no expense to any
other member constitutes an unambiguous improvement in society overall. Failure to
undertake that improvement is, by economists' standards, inefficient. When society has
satisfied the Pareto Optimality definition of economic efficiency, all such opportunities for
improving people's welfare have been taken advantage of, and there are no more such
improvements that can be made. Pareto Optimality, however, does not include or address the
issue of redistributing wealth in the favor of some to the disadvantage of others, for e.xample,
from the rich to the poor. That is a separate issue, one that does not conflict with economic
efficiency. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. For an expanded discussion of Pareto
Optimality, see E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 440-44.
34. Coase, supra note 2, at 6-8.

72

586

IOWA LAW REVIEW

577 [1987]

Coase's analysis leading to his conclusion-that the assignment of
property rights is irrelevant to economic efficiency-is generally referred to
as the Coase Theorem. s5 Based on these arguments, Coase in effect
declares Pigouvian analysis irrelevant to achieving economic efficiency, and
therefore not useful for the resolution oflegal disputes. Having disposed of
Pigou's policy recommendation of internalization, Coase then turns to his
own policy recommendation, to be used in those circumstances in which the
court's property right assignment can be used to promote economic
efficiency.s6 Coase's policy is referred to here as the total product rule.

C.

Coase's Total Product Rule

Although Coase concludes that parties affected by externalities (i.e.,
indirect social costs such as pollution) produce the same levels of output
regardless of who is required to bear those soci~ costs, he says that this
conclusion holds true only if no impediments to the bargaining process
exist. s7 In reality, the process of negotiation itself may bar an efficient
outcome. Complexities, such as the gathering of complete information, the
inclusion of all relevant parties, and the effort to ensure adherence to all
agreed terms, are costly.S8 Labeling these complexities ma.rket transactions
costs 39 (subsequently shortened by other writers to transactions costs),40 Coase
argues that they limit negotiations to those instances in which the increased
value resulting from the exchanged rights exceeds the transactions costs. In
some cases, the transactions costs may be so high that they prohibit any
negotiations, no matter how mutually profitable the negotiations would be
in the absence of transactions costs.41 Therefore, Coase asserts that courts,
when ruling on entitlement disputes, must assign the property right not on
the basis of traditional notions of property rights, but on the basis of
maximizing total product.42 Furthermore, he argues that economists

35. See su/lra note 3.
36. Coase, supra note 2, at 33.
37. rd. at 15.
38. rd.
39. rd. Pr,:>fessor Farber points to a potentially more fundamental barrier to negotiations:
the lack of necessary understanding and perception on the part of the parties. See Farber, supra
note 10, at 919. Though Professor Farber does not express it in these terms, in fact what he •
suggests is truly an example of "transactions costs."
40. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment,
11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 n.5 (1968); EIlickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Ne~ghbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623, 624 (1986); Vogel, The Coase Theorem and
California Animal Trespass Law, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 149 (1987).
41. Coase, supra note 2, at 15.
42. Coase states:
In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the
efficiency with which the economic system operates. One arrangement of rights may
bring about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this is the
arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs of reaching the same
result by altering and combining rights through the market may be so great that this
optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which it would
bring, may never be achieved.
!d. at 16.
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should advocate this approach rather than Pigou's internalization policy.43
Coase does not provide a coherent formula or methodology that
would allow courts to determine how property rights should be assigned to
maximize total product. 44 Instead he gives a numerical example in which a
court, by resting its decision solely on traditional property rules, would
drive a socially useful enterprise out of business.45 The following scenario
best captures Coase's concern for the inefficiencies created by market
transactions costs and the role that property right assignments can play. It
is based on a fact pattern originally put forth by Pigou to demonstrate his
internalization policies. Coase chooses the same fact pattern for his own
numerical example46 and many writers have used it over the years as a
paradigm to convey the essence of the problem of transactions costs. 47
The example, based on a nineteenth century concern, involves the
impact of railroad expansion on farmers. The railroad operations cast off
sparks that cause damage to crops grown on land adjacent to the tracks. If
the railroad is held liable for the damage and no barriers inhibit negotiations between it and the farmers; then the railroad could relieve itself of
liability by compensating the farmers in advance of the growing season for
the forgone profits associated with the expected crop damage. Each farmer
should be willing to accept this offer since he would be in the same position
with the railroad's payment as he would be raising the crops and selling
them for a profit. The economic outcome will be that the railroad runs its
trains and the farmers choose not to grow crops on the adjacent land.
However, in the presence of transactions costs-which, in this case, arise
from the fact that the railroad must negotiate with thousands of farmersthe railroad cannot feasibly take advantage of negotiations in advance of
the growing season. Thus, as the damage occurs, farmers sue the railroad,
which must then pay for the harm. Because the railroad's liability, in this
case, is the market value of the damaged crops (which includes not only the
profits of the crops but also the cost of planting the crops), the liability can
easily exceed the farmers' forgone profits the railroad would have paid had
it been able to negotiate with each farmer individually and in advance. 48
Under extreme circumstances, the increased liability could be sufficiently
large to drive the railroad out of business; whereas, if advance negotiations
had been possible, the railroad operations would have been profitable.49
43. "When an economist is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements." Id. at 34.
44. For a similar point, see Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982).
45. Coase, supra note 2, at 32-34.
46.Id.
47. See Cooter, supra note 44, at 2; Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205
passim (1973); Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust
Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 17,27-28 nn.58 & 60-61 (1983).
48. Whether the advance payment of forgone profits in e.xchange for leaving the adjacent
land untilled is less than paying for the market price of damaged crops after they have been
grown depends on what percentage of the crop will be destroyed by the sparks. The
assumption here is that the damage is so great that the railroad will prefer to pay in advance.
49. Assume that the railroad performs services worth $250 per year and the cost of
running the trains is $100 per year. Assume further that farmers collectively grow $200 worth
of crops each year on land adjacent to the track at a cost to them of $125 per year. Finally,
assume that the railroad causes $175 worth of damage to the crops if they are grown there.
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Under these circumstances Coase would argue that it is imperative for the
courts not to hold the railroad liable; for, as he says in his own example,50
the loss of railroad service would be a tremendous loss to society. Furthermore, if the railroad were assigned the right to cast sparks, the economic
outcome would mirror more closely what would have occurred if there had
been no transactions costs: that is, the farmers would choose not to grow on
acres where their crops would be damaged, and the railroad would run its
trains.til
The inexorable lesson appears to be that the court should ignore the
traditional basis for resolving property disputes. The scenario calls for the
railroad to be held free of liability and indeed, a decision the other way
seems in retrospect to be a foolish impediment to economic prosperity. This
example, along with others, serves to point to the need to apply the total
product rule for property assignments. But Coase's failure to provide a
systematic method to determine how to assign property rights so as to
maximize total product and assure an appropriate application of his rule
led his followers to develop criteria which the courts could use.

Thm the following facts are true:
Revenue
Farmers
Railroad

$200
$250

Costs
$125
S100

Profits

$ 75

Crop Damage
from trains:
$175

$150

If the railroad negotiates with the farmers in advance, it merely needs to pay them $75 to
compen!,ate fc.r the forgone profits from not planting. The railroad is willing to do this because
it earns a proft of$150 from its enterprise. After the payment of$75 to the farmers, it still has
a remaining profit of $75 for itself. If the railroad is not able to negotiate in advance, the
farmers grow the crops, $175 of which is damaged by the trains each year. If the railroad is
forced to pay ,:his, the amount exceeds its profit of $150 and the railroad will choose, instead,
to go out of busine~s.
50. One reason, among others, that Coase's own numerical example and analysis is not
used here h that it does not involve transactions costs. This is surprising, of course, considering
the emphasis Coase places on market transactions costs, not only in his paper in general, see
Coa,e, supra r.ote 2, at 15-30, but also in his discussion introducing his numerical example:
"The problem is whether it would be desirable to make the railway liable in conditions in which
it is too expensive for such bargains to be made," Vi. at 31. Furthermore, the other problems
with Coa~e's analysi·. of his particular numbers are beyond the scope of this Article. For a brief
discussion of some of these problems, see Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost in Retrospect, 2 REs.
L. & ECON. 83, 91-93 (1980).
The scenario presented in the text, in contrast, does capture the essence of the transactions
co~W problem that Coase so aptly raises and discusses. It shows the economically efficient
outcome that "{Quid occur absent transaction!. costs (the railroad purcha;es from the farmers
the right to ca';t sparks, the farmers do not grow crops, and the trains nm) and it shows how
the presence of transactions costs drives the railroad out of business-an inefficient and
und.,'sirable result. It also shows how the reassignment of rights can remedy the problem.
Implicitly, this perspective of the transactions costs problem has been adopted by subsequent
writers addres~;ing the issue. Sec, most notably, Posner's policy recommendation to assign the
right to the party who would have purchased it absent transactions costs, discussed infra text
accompanying notes 52-57, and G. Calabresi's alternative, which is to assign the liability to the
part I' who would have purchased the right, discussed Infra text accompanying notes 259-69.
51. Sf<' Coase, supra note 2, at 33. Of course, the most salient difference under the right
assignment is that the railroad receives the right to cast sparks without paying for them.
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A Total Product Rule According to Posner

While many writers have developed methods for applying a rule to
maximize total product in a courtroom situation,52 the most influential
Coase supporter in this area has been Judge Richard A. Posner.53 His
product rule criterion states that the courts should assign property rights to
the party who, in the absence of transactions costs, would have purchased
the rights from the other party if the rights had been awarded to that other
party.54 In other words, he suggests assigning the property right to the
party who "values" it more, inferring from economic arguments that this
party uses the right more "efficiently" or at least adds more to total
product. 55
The railroad hypothetical can serve to illustrate Posner's arguments.
Suppose there are no transactions costs, e.g., there is one adjacent farmer
and that farmer owns the property right of not having sparks damage his
crops. Assuming the railroad values the right to cast sparks more than the
farmer values having his crops remain undamaged, it can be shown that the
railroad will end up with the right to cast sparks regardless of whether the
farmer or the railroad initially owns the right. If the farmer initially owns
the right, then because the railroad values the right more, the railroad will
be willing and able to purchase the right from the farmer by offering to pay
for the farmer's forgone profits. If the railroad initially holds the right, the
farmer's lesser value of the right leaves the farmer unwilling to offer a sum
sufficiently large to induce the railroad to sell the right. Therefore,
regardless of the initial right holder's identity, the railroad will ultimately
own the right either through purchase or award.
Fundamentally, the railroad obtains the right regardless of the initial
assignment because the railroad derives more economic benefit from the
right. The railroad derives more economic benefit because society is willing
to pay more for the services the railroad produces with that right (i.e., train
services) than society is willing to pay for the farmer's production with that
right (i.e., the profits of the crops). That is proof, Posner says, that the
railroad contributes more to total product and is therefore the more
efficient user of the right. 56 Since the more efficient user of the right is the
party who, absent transactions costs, would purchase it from the other party
(if the right were initially assigned to that other party), Posner asserts that
the party's incentive to purchase the right should be dispositive in deciding
property disputes.
Thus, when transactions costs bar the railroad's negotiations with

52. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Dales, lAnd, Water, and Ownership, 1 CAN.
J. ECON. 791 (1968); Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the lAw, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 255
(1967); Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980).
53. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer (formerly Lee and
Brena Freeman Professor), University of Chicago Law School.
54. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 45 (3d ed. 1986).
55.Id.
56. See id. at 42-43.
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adjacent land owners, e.g., when the sheer number of adjacent land owners
makes it difficult for the railroad to negotiate with all of them in advance,
the railroad and the farmers are likely to litigate the railroad's liability for
crop damage. Posner reasons that in order to overcome any barriers created
by the transactions costs that prevent the railroad from purchasing the
right, the court should assign the right to the railroad directly, regardless of
the result dictated by traditional property rules. Therefore, the railroad
should be made free of liability for the crop damage on the basis that the
railroad would have purchased the rights from the farmers in advance (if
the railroad did not already own them) had there been no transaction costs
to bar the negotiations. Since that fact proves that between the two parties
the railroad is the more efficient user of the right, Posner argues that such
an assignment will maximize total product.57 Posner's articulation of these
standards for invocation and application of the total product rule provided
needed guidelines missing in Coase's original article.

II. A

CRITIQUE OF THE TOTAL PRODUCT RULE

A. Economic EJfzciency
Careful scrutiny of the Coase-Posner total product rule approach
indicates that application of the total product rule does not promote
economic efficiency to any greater extent than do traditional property
rules. In filct, the total product rule is just as likely as traditional property
rules to le:;sen economic efficiency as it is to enhance it. Furthermore, the
application of the total product rule will serve as a means of redistributing
wealth, most frequently from the less to the more economically advantaged.
Recall that Coase subscribes to the total product rule because he thinks
it is necessary to promote economic efficiency by assigning property rights
to the more efficient user and thereby increasing the total productivity of
the two parties. 58 Coase implicitly assumes that increased economic efficiency between the two parties would automatically increase efficiency for
society as a whole. The linchpin of Coase's policy is the Rncrease in the total
product of the two parties that purportedly results from assigning the right
to the party who will use it more efficiently. If Coase's policy recommendation is correct, then every application of his total product rule should
result in increased efficiency. In fact, however, that does not happen;
indeed, the application of the rule can simply result in a different source of
inefficiency.
Without transactions costs, the two parties bargain to distribute the
right between them in the most economically efficient manner. In other
words, as a result of negotiations, one party will not necessarily get the
exdusive use of the right, but may simply reduce the extent of its use,
permitting both parties to exercise the right to some degree. In contrast, in
a property dispute in which transactions costs bar negotiations, even
though a court must assign the property right to one or the other party, no
57. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 18 (lst ed. 1973); Posner, supra note 47; passim.
58. See Coase, stlpra note 2, at 34, discussed supra text accompanying notes 37-51.

ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON MAN

591

(or limited) negotiations can take place. The parties will thus be unable to
negotiate to share the use of the property right and reach their optimal
levels of output. The result is that the party getting the award will tend to
overproduce due to unrestrained exercise of the right, while the other party
will underproduce because of interferences with its production process.
Transactions costs prevent the losing party from purchasing a share of the
right or paying the winning party to cut back its use. Inefficiency results
regardless of who receives the property right. Therefore, the court's
efficiency concern narrows to which assignment will cause less inefficiency.
The Coase-Posner rule suggests that the property right should be assigned
to the party that contributes more to the total product of society.59 That
assignment, however, will not necessarily be to the party which uses the
right less inefficiently.
The following example demonstrates that the total product rule will
not necessarily improve efficiency. Suppose that one party's use of the right
interferes minimally with the other party's operations, but the other party's
use of the right substantially or totally interferes with the first party's
operations. Thus, in the firm-farmer hypothetical,6o the farmer's right to
pOllution-free water may only be a minor interference to the firm, whereas
the firm's production may destroy most of the farmer's crops. If the firm
contributes more to total product, the total product rule would call for the
assignment to the firm-even though the assignment of the right would
result in almost total destruction of the farmer's crops. This is less efficient
than if the award of the right were made to the farmer. In the latter case the
firm would have to keep a pollution-free river, which would affect the firm
only slightly. The farmer could produce everything that would be profitable to produce and the firm could produce nearly everything, making an
assignment to the farmer a more efficient outcome.
Viewing the same analysis from another perspective, assume that
when no transactions costs exist, the optimal allocation of the right occurs
when the farmer uses ninety percent of the right and the firm uses ten
percent. If, in the presence of transactions costs, a court assigns the right to
the firm on the grounds that the firm contributes more to total product,
and given that no negotiations can take place, then the firm will use one
hundred percent of the right instead of the optimal ten percent. This
outcome is dearly and significantly less efficient than an award made to the
farmer that permits the farmer to use one hundred percent of the right
instead of the optimal ninety percent. 61 Thus, awarding the right to the
59. "The law can resolve incompatible uses either by recognizing a property right in the
party whose use is the more valuable or by imposing liability on the other party." R. POSNER,
supra note 10, at 39.
60. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
61. Suppose that the firm, which is the more efficient user of the right to pollute 10% of
the river, produces $100 per week of paper with the use of that right. Assume this costs the
farmer a decrease in crop value of $20. Furthermore, assume that if the firm pollutes the river
unabatedly, i.e., a 100% pollution level, its total product will increase $200, but the farmer's
crop value will decrease $300. The optimal outcome, absent transactions costs, calls for the firm
to purchase from the farmer (if the farmer owns the right) the right to pollute at a 10% level.
The firm is dearly willing to do so since it values the 10% right at $100, as compared with the
farmer's value of $20. The firm is dearly the more efficient user of that much of the right and
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party that contributes more to total product does not always lead to greater
economic efficiency between the two parties.
Coase's omission of specific guidelines to maximize total product is not
the sole reason for his policy's failure to ensure improved efficiency. Similar
problems result when using Posner's criteria for assigning the property
right. Posner would assign the property right to the party who, absent
transactions costs, would purchase it from the other party. The willingness
to purchase the right, Posner argues, indicates that the party values it more
and would thus contribute more to total product.62 As a way of illustrating
th{' difficulties with Posner's rule, consider a situation in which the
respective transactions costs of the two parties differ.
Suppose, in the railroad-farmer hypothetical,63 that the farmer's
transactions costs for initiating negotiations exceed the railroad's transactions costs for initiating negotiations. If the railroad is not liable for the
damage caused by its sparks, then, absent transactions costs, the farmers
will collectively offer to compensate the railroad to reduce the number of
trains run 1:0 the efficient number. Each farmer contributes a share to the
compensation that reflects the gain to the farmer of a reduction in the
number of trains run. In the aggregate, the collective shares sufficiently
compensate the railroad to induce a reduction to the socially optimal
number of trains. In reality, however, farmers operating collectively incur
extremely high transactions costs, thereby reducing the number of farmers
who partic<pate and reducing the amount of compensation the railroad
receives. As a result, the railroad reduces the number of trains running by
less than the social optimum. The greater the transactions costs of collective
action on the part of the farmers, the less negotiation undertaken and as a
result the more remote the actual outcome is from efficiency.
On th(~ other hand, if the railroad is liable for the sparks damage, then,
absent transactions costs, the railroad compensates the farmers for their
forg'one profits and the railroad schedules the same number of trains that
it would ,~hen it is not liable. The liability rule affects the outcome,
however, when the impact of transactions costs are considered. In this case,
the transactions costs to the railroad of negotiating with the farmers is
comparativdy small (e.g., as each owner fIles a complaint, the railroad pays
for the damage for that period and then negotiates -to pay the forgone
profits in the future). Thus, due to its lower transactions costs, the railroad,
by being held liable, achieves an outcome significantly closer to efficiency
than if it ,~ere not liable. But under Posner's assignment rule, since the
railroad would purchase the right if not assigned it (absent transactions
costs) it would not be held liable. As a result, Posner's assignment rule
actually chooses the option that leads to less efficiency and lower total
conuibutes more to total product. However, under the total product rule, when transactions
costs bar these negotiations, the "right to pollute" would be awarded tCo the firm. Since the
largest increase in the firm's product is with a 100% pollution level, that is clearly what the firm
would do if awarded the right. This results in a less efficient outcome than if the pollution
rights were assigned to the farmer.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 52·57.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 46·51.
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product-in contradiction of Coase's total product rule. 64 Therefore, under
either Coase or Posner's guidelines the total product rule does not
guarantee, even as between the two parties, an assignment of property
rights that will bring the parties as close as possible to economic efficiency.
Furthermore, even if criteria could be developed that would assure
consistent assignments of property rights so that the parties could achieve,
as close as possible, their optimal use of the right and produce their optimal
output, this attempt to maximize the efficiency of the two parties would not
ensure that society's efficiency, as a whole, would be improved. This is
because changes in the market for any given product reverberate throughout the economy. Assume, for example, that in the firm-farmer hypothetical,65 the parties are in court, seeking the award of the property right with
respect to pollution in the river. Assume further that significant transactions costs prohibit negotiations between the parties concerning the allocation of that right. The court's assignment of the property right will
determine what output the two parties will ultimately produce. If the
assignment is made to the firm, the firm will overproduce and the farmer
will underproduce. If the assignment is made to the farmer the opposite
will result. If the firm is given the assignment and overproduces, this will
tend to lower the price for the paper it produces. Therefore consumers will
tend to buy more paper and less of other goods. This change in consumption will affect the total product of society in some way. The same will be
true if the assignment is given to the farmer, causing the firm to
underproduce. This would raise the price of paper, causing consumers to
buy more of other goods. This also affects the total product of society. This
effect occurs whether or not the assignment is such that the two parties to
the dispute end up, between themselves, as close as possible to efficiency.
Without full and complete data about the effects throughout the
economy, one cannot predict a priori which assignment results in the
greatest total product. In fact, the aggregate effect cannot be predicted by
any general economic rule. The only way to determine whether a particular
right assignment generates a net gain or loss over alternative assignments is
to engage in an extensive data analysis not only of the disputing parties but
also of all the potential reverberations throughout the economy-an
undertaking usually beyond the scope of most COUrts.66 Since the ultimate
economic outcome of an assignment rule based on Coasian total product analysis is
unpredictable, the assignment rule itself is not logically justifwd on economic
eJfzciency grounds. Furthermore, as a corollary, an assignment based on rules of
equity and property is, a priori,just as likely to create the greatest net gain (or loss)
in aggregate total product as one based on a total product analysis of the disputing
parties.
64. For analyses suggesting that liability (and not the property right) should be assigned to
the party with the lowest transactions costs, see Mishan, supra note 52, at 267-69, and Randall,
Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice, 54 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 175, 178
(1972).
65. See supra note 31 and accomp?I1ying text.
66. Gunther, Forward, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1972) (discussing inability of courts to
address some kinds of social and economic problems "because the data are e.'(ceedingly
technical and complex").
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In the example above, it was assumed that the assignment of the right
would not lead the two parties to their optimal outcome. Instead, they
would merely move as close as possible to that point. This assumption does
not, how<:ver, affect the conclusion that the assignment of the property
right according to a total product rule does not assure an improvement in
societal efficiency. Even if the rules could be designed to guarantee the
optimal outcome between the disputing parties, applying the rules still doe&
not ensure that society'S (economic) welfare has improved overall.
Economists have demonstrated rigorously that when constraints on
efficiency (such as transactions costs barring negotiations) exist throughout
the economy, applying policies to induce efficiency between some of the
parties is not necessarily or even likely to be an economic improvement for
society as a whole. 67 Indeed, it is possible that permitting fewer parties to be
efficient is economically superior to making many (but not all) parties
efticient. Therefore, applying policies to bring as many parties as possible
to economic efficiency may not lead to the greatest total product for society.
When many parties in society are constrained from achieving an
economically efficient outcome, bringing only some of those parties to their
economically efficient outcome will have a ripple effect on other parties in
society. Once again, without exhaustive data, the courts cannot know in
advance whether the increase in total product that results from the
disputing parties being made efficient will be offset by a lessening of total
product for other parties that stems from this maximization process.
Formalized as the Theory of the Second Best,68 the analysis proves
that the intuition-that it is economically superior to achieve as many
efficient conditions as possible-is wrong. It is true that society achieves a
maximum total product when all markets are efficient simultaneously. But as
the Theory of the Second Best demonstrates, once the economy in fact
departs from this ideal, the second best solution does not consist of
myopically evaluating each individual dispute for the purpose of maximizing efficiency between the two parties as a way of maximizing total product
for society. This, however, is precisely what the Coasian analysis suggests for
public policy. Even when the Coasian analysis can (if ever possible) provide
assignment rules that satisfy optimal conditions for the disputing parties,
applying the rules as law actually may have the economic effect of lowering
overall product.

67. See, e.g., Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11
(1956).
138. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 67, was published four years before Coase's article, The
Problem of Soctal Cost, appeared. Coase may have been unaware of the pioneering work that was
being undertlken by Lipsey and Lancaster (as well as others) at the time he was writing his
paper. Howeller, the Theory of the Second Best is not an obscure theory; it is well-known and
often cited in many articles published in mainstream economic journals. See, e.g., McManus,
Comments on the General Theory of Second Best, 26 REv. ECON. STUD. 209 (1959). It is at least
referred to, if not explained in some detail, in every leading undergraduate te.'{t used to teach
economics m:Uors. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, Sllpra note 3, at 461-62.
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The Redistribution of Wealth

If in fact Coase's policy recommendation to follow the total product
rule does not necessarily accomplish its purpose, the rule gives doubtful
guidance for legal disputes in which economic efficiency is the goal. One
must ask, then, what effect the total product rule does have. One way of
determining its impact is to analyze it in a functional sense, that is, to look
at when and how the rule operates. As shall be seen, such an analysis
demonstrates that in fact the total product rule operates as a wealth
redistribution scheme tending to favor the economically advantaged. 69
Many commentators have criticized the Coase Theorem in an effort to
undermine the validity of Coase's policy recommendation. 7o Their motivation in attacking the theorem seems to be, or can at least be viewed as, a
response to an intuitive recognition that the policy recommendation has a
built-in bias favoring large corporations and others who are economically
advantaged at the expense of the less advantaged. These critics obviously
believe that the only way to attack the policy recommendation is to attack
the theorem underlying it.
The total product rule, however, fails as a policy based on economic
efficiency-even accepting the validity of the Coase Theorem. 71 The total
product rule is independently vulnerable. While the Coase Theorem may
be analytically faulty,72 the failure of the total product rule to enhance
economic efficiency does not rest on the invalidity of the theorem.
Good reasons support the conclusion that Coase's policy recommendation does embody an inherent bias in favor of the economically
advantaged. The concept of "maximizing total product"73 tends to favor

69. A number of writers have addressed the issue of the wealth effect of Coasian analysis.
They primarily focus on the wealth implications of the Coase Theorem, however, and not on
the redistributive effects on his policy recommendation, which is an entirely different matter.
These writers focus on how the assignment of liability affects the relative wealth of the parties
and whether this undermines the validity of the Coase Theorem. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 6,
at 13; Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 19-28 (1972);
Kelman, supra note 15, at 678-95; Mishan, supra note 52, at 269-8l.
70. In addition to the sources cited supra note 6, see Cooter, supra note 44; Polinsky,
Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis
of Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1655, 1669-80 (1974).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68.
72. Cooter, supra note 44, at 14-24, contains an excellent discussion of the inherent
problems with the Coase Theorem.
73. This expression and ones similar to it, such as "maximizing utility," "maximizing social
welfare," and "maximizing joint production," are used in many different ways to mean many
different concepts, by both economists and noneconomists alike, often within the same article.
The references cited in the footnotes of this Article as well as this Article itself are replete with
examples. There is a rigorous notion in economics of increasing the level of society's
satisfaction from the available resources (i.e., Pareto Optimality) that motivates the use of these
expressions. However, there are limitations on that notion that are significant for policy
purposes, ,the important ones of which are discussed infra text accompanying notes 103-12.
These limitations are often obscured if not altogether lost when verbal concepts such as
"maximizing total product" are used. In part, this is an inevitable result of transferring a
scientific concept such as the modem day version of Pareto Optimality to the literary
framework of law and applying it to issues that arise there. The reader should be alerted that
reasonable inferences drawn from such terminology may not be meant or intended by the
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entrepreneurial activities. In the typical property right dispute envisioned
by Coase and Posner, the parties usually would consist of a large corporation implementing technological advances and a small individual entrepreneur or private citizen. In using Coase's approach to maximizing total
product, a court would be unlikely to find that the large corporation is not
adding more to the economic pie than the small entrepreneur or landowner. An assignment of the right to the small landowner would be seen as
preventing the corporation from producing, thus leaving society'S total
product the same as it was before the corporation came onto the scene.
Assigning the right to the corporation, however, would be perceived as
permittin;5 the addition of the entire total product the corporation is
e,rpected to produce, at the expense of "minor" intrusions on the rights of
a few individuals surrounding the corporation. Thus the corporation must
win when the courts use as a criterion the relative product of the parties.
Such bias is further enhanced when the corporation faces only a fe,v
representatives of a much larger class. In that instance, the extent of the
class and the extent of the right deprivation cannot be fully evaluated by the
court. The court, then, will underestimate the collective value of the right
to the members of the class in comparison with the value of the right to the
corporation, thereby further increasing the probability that the corporation
wiII win.
The inherent bias in favor of the economically advantaged is merely
one manifestation of the wealth redistribution effects of the total product
rule. Anor.her indication of the redistributive impact stems from the total
product rule's selective impact-the rule has effect only when it makes an
assignment of a right that varies from the one that would be made using
traditional property rules. If traditional property rules would dictate that A
has the right, but the application of the Coase-Posner total product rule
would require that B should be assigned the right, then dearly the shift of
the wealth resource from A to B is a redistributive effect. However, the total
product rule will not always require such a transfer. One party may be
entitled to the right by virtue of both traditional property law and the total
producf rule. But recalling that the total product rule itself does not
promote economic efficiency,74 then obviously in these cases the rule serves
no independent purpose. Therefore, the only remaining conclusion regarding the total product rule's effect is that it serves solely to redistribute
wealth.
The redistributive aspect of the total product rule also can be seen by
examining what could happen if the courts adopted the total product rule
for resolving legal disputes generally. Since the rule ostensibly purports to
remedy the interference with efficiency created by the presence of transactions costs, then in cases in which transactions costs are a barrier, the use
of the total product rule would not be inconsistent with that purpose. Yet
when transactions costs are not interfering with negotiations-which may
or may no;:. be discernible by the court-and the parties are merely seeking
l

authors. Even in instances in which such inferences are intended, they may be wrong. The
discussion infra note 108 should make this point clear.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68, 103-18.
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to resolve a property right dispute, then the application of the total product
rule to assign the property right contrary to the assignment dictated by
traditional property law can only serve to redistribute wealth. In this sense
the total product rule is overinclusive.
The question also arises whether the rule is necessary to overcome the
effects of transactions costs. For example, given that transactions costs
create inefficiencies in the marketplace, the maTketplace may be the most
efficient forum to resolve those impediments. If the marketplace can
overcome the barriers, then the assignment of property rights according to
traditional property rules will not interfere with the achievement of
efficiency. If so, then the total product rule lacks justification, reaffirming
that, as a practical matter, the rule serves solely to redistribute wealth.
For an example illustrating how the marketplace can overcome
transactions costs, reconsider the railroad-farmer hypothetical75 that purports to demonstrate the need for the total product rule to avoid economic
inefficiency and social loss. In the hypothetical, the railroad is spewing
sparks onto the landowner's property and causing crop damage. In the
absence of transactions costs the railroad would pay the farmer not to grow
crops on that portion of the land exposed to the sparks. The amount the
railroad pays the farmer is small enough .so that the railroad can still
operate profitably and large enough to induce the farmer to accept the
offer. Transactions costs, according to the hypothetical, prevent the railroad from negotiating with the landowners in advance so that crops will not
be grown. As a result, the farmers grow their crops and the railroad
damages a portion of them. If the railroad is held liable for the damaged
crops, not only are the damages greater than the railroad would have paid
if it had been able to negotiate in advance, but the damages are so large that
the railroad is no longer profitable and goes out of business. The railroad's
crop damage liability exceeds what the advance payment would have been
because the advance payment represents only the profits lost by the farmer
from not growing the crops. Crop damage liability, however, represents the
market value of the damaged crops that includes not only lost profits, but
also the costs of growing the crops as well. 76
The purpose of this example is to demonstrate the usefulness of the
total product rule. The result that occurs if there are no transactions costs
(i.e., the railroad pays the farmer in advance not to grow the crops) is an
economically efficient outcome. The result that occurs when there are
transactions costs and the railroad is held liable for the damages (i.e., the
railroad goes out of business) is clearly an inefficient outcome. According to
the hypothetical, the only solution seems to be the assignment of the right
to the railroad-thus providing compelling evidence of the need for a total
product rule. Posner further points out that assigning the property right to
the railroad leads to an outcome very similar (although not identical) to the
one that would have occurred were there no transactions costs, and the
parties could negotiate. 77 That is, the railroad, no longer liable for any crop
75. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
76. To review the earlier discussion, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying te.xt.
77. R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 18.
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damage, remains in business; the farmer, knowing that compensation for
crop damage is not available to cover damages that exceed the profits from
the crops, will choose not to grow crops. The only difference between the
original efficient outcome and the Coasian total product outcome is that the
railroad, and not the farmer, keeps the forgone profits.
This example raises the question whether the solution of assigning the
property right to the railroad is necessary to overcome the transactions costs
effect. If not, then Coase's solution exemplifies how the total product rule
operates merely to redistribute wealth. In this example, Coase implicitly
assumes that markets do not induce efficient behavior in response to
transactions costs. 7S That is, he assumes that the parties lack sufficient
incentives to overcome the effects of the transactions costs. Coase wrongly
assumes, however, that an efficient outcome may be achieved only by
reassigning property rights. Even in the railroad-farmer hypothetical with
transactions costs the railroad will not go out of business if it is made liable.
The market grants more than one route to the efficient outcome; the
negotiations in advance with all the landowners are not the only means.
The railroad could offer to buy the land from the landowners. Economically, this is exactly the same as offering to compensate tlle landowners for
the forgone profits, for it is a well-known economic fact that the price of any
piece ofland is equal to the present (discounted) value of its future flow of
profits. 79 )f the railroad negotiates with the farmers in advance, it would
have to compensate them for the forgone profits each year. Since the
railroad presumably intends to operate over a long period of time,
purchasing the land accomplishes the economic equivalent of paying for
the profits each year and does it more efficiently as well, since negotiations
are concluded in one period rather than repeated over time.
Not only would the purchase of the land yield the same efficient
outcome absent transactions costs, but the railroad should prefer to buy the
land rath(:r than negotiate with all the landowners in advance. If the
railroad buys the land then it need buy only from those owners who
suffered damage sufficiently large to make it worth their effort to contact
the railroad. This strategy would cost the railroad less than negotiating to
pay all the adjacent landowners, whether or not they experienced significant damage. so Thus, although it is possible to portray scenarios in which
transactions costs bar one route to achieving economic efficiency, this does
not mean that the marketplace will not find another one.81 In this light, the
necessity for a total product rule to overcome transactions costs becomes
highly questionable.
78. This is ironic since both Coase and Posner are strong advocates of reliance on the
marketplace .md are, in general, opposed to governmental interference to resolve economic
pr(,blems. SCI' Coase, supra note 2, at 17-19; see also R. POSNER, supra note 54, passim.
79. This proposition shares such wide recognition that it appears in Judge Posner's book
(albeit in a different example from Posner's illustrations of the Coase Theorem). See R. POSNER,
supra note 54, at 30-32.
80. Even the courts recognize the advantage to the defendant of "buying out" the potential
plaintiff when the prospects of compensatory damages appear too onerous. See Union Oil Co.
v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974).
31. For an acknowledgement of the existence of market efficiency with respect to
transactions costs, see Randall, supra note 64, at 181.
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Not only does Coase underestimate the ability of the marketplace to
resolve inefficiencies, he also underestimates the ability of the courts to
fashion decrees that are both equitable and efficacious in overcoming the
inefficiencies caused by transactions costs. 82 Thus, in his example, Coase
assumes that the right must be assigned either to the farmer or to the
railroad. In this "either-or" scenario, assigning the right to the farmer puts
the railroad out of business, and assigning the right to the railroad results
in a taking of the farmer's use of his land. Coase fails to address the. ability
of the courts to issue equitable decrees that leave the parties in the position
they would have been in had there been no transactions costs and the
parties had bargained to an efficient outcome. For example, Coase overlooks the fact that the court could declare that traditional property rules
dictate that the farmer owns the right to the land but efficiency considerations dictate that the farmer's damage award be limited to a sum equal to
the forgone profits from the crops.83 This remedy leaves the farmer to
mitigate damages without depriving him of total use of his land. That is, the
farmer decides whether or not to grow crops but does so at his own risk
since the court has already determined that the farmer may collect only the
lost profits and not damages for lost crops. Thus the courts could correct
inefficiencies generated by transactions costs without making either one of
the parties worse off.

82. Coase is not alone in this error. Posner fmds it "unrealistic to expect courts to discover
the optimum [combination of property right assignments]-and uneconomical to make them
search too hard for it!" R. POSNER, supra note 54, at 45. As the discussion in the text indicates,
such a judgment denies the equitable dimensions of the issue and thus does not reflect judicial
experience to fashion suitable remedies.
83. In fact, the courts have fashioned exacdy this remedy in the area of nuisance law. For
example, in Lassiter v. Norfolk & C.R. Co., 126 N.C. 509, 36 S.E. 48 (1900), a real-world
dispute between a farmer and a railroad, the court awarded "permanent damages" equal to the
change in the market value of the farmer's affected land. The reasoning of the court parallels
the analysis in the text quite closely. The quotation speaks for itself:
If the damage ... will probably recur from a given state of things which the defendant
refuses to change, and which the Court from motives of public policy will not make
him change, permanent damages are allowed as the only way of doing justice to the
plaintiff, and at ·the same time preventing interminable litigation. As far as the
plaintiff is concerned, permanent and recurring damages are the same to him, if they
equally result in the destruction of his property. The latter are in some respects worse
than the former, as they merely prolong his agony, and may cause even greater loss.
For instance, if a farmer knows that the railroad has acquired a right to [harm] his
land, he will not plant it; whereas, if he relies upon their subsequent forbearance
from unlawful injury, he may suffer not only the damage to his land, but also the loss
of his labor, seed and fertilizer. In other words, the loss of the crop means the loss of
everything that has been put into the crop.
Id. at 514,36 S.E. at 49. Generally, the courts take the following posture:
Where a permanent nuisance is involved and for reasons of policy courts will not
abate it by injunction, the tortfeasor acquires what amounts to an easement to commit
the nuisance, on payment of the depreciation in market value. Some courts,
apparendy on the theory that the "easement" is not acquired until the tortfeasor pays
the depreciation, have allowed the plaintiff in permanent nuisance cases to recover
not only the diminution in his land value by reason of the nuisance, but also any
special damages, such as loss of crops, which he suffered before trial ....
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 638.
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The Constitutionality of the Total Product Rule

Coase's total product rule with its reassignment of property rights
without compensation raises serious constitutional questions relating to the
state's power to regulate or take property for the public use. Coase, in
effect, teHs the courts that if society's total product would be improved by
awarding the property to one party, they should do so even though the
effect of the ruling does not include compensation for the party deprived
of the ril~ht.8'1 Coase's approach would permit the courts to treat this
reassignment of rights as an exercise of police power regulation rather than
ali a taking, by using a unidimensional analysis of economic efficiency
rather than the multifaceted balancing test historically demanded by the
courts for making such distinctions. 85 The multifaceted balancing test
considers, inter alia, the extent of the deprivation, the substantiality of the
public interest, whether the owner is being discriminatorily singled out for
such treatment, and to what extent the regulation frustrates "distinct
investment-backed expectations."86 The overarching considerations in determining whether an act of regulation constitutes a taking and thus
requires compensation, however, are '~ustice and faimess."87
This much more comprehensive balancing test might well dictate
different i:esults than Coase's narrower total product rule. 'Vhereas Coase's
approach would always require a finding that the state merely exercised its
regulatory police powers, the court's balancing test might well conclude that
the reassil~nment of the right constituted a taking which requires compensation. Of course, this does not mean that the balancing test would not
sometimes lead to a conclusion that the reassignment was a proper exercise
of police power. Therefore, there are instances when the Coasian analysi~.
and the traditional balancing test would yield the same results and instances
where they would not.
The balancing test could consistently support Co asian analysis if the
total product rule invariably enhanced economic efficiency over traditional
property right assignments. Promotion of economrc efficiency would
provide the preponderant or substantial public interest necessary to sustain
an exercise of police power regulation. 88 The total product rule, however,
does not ::r.lways enhance economic efficiency89 and to that extent, it cannot
satisfy the substantial public interest requirement. Without this substantial
public int':!rest aspect, the state is merely shifting property rights from one
party to another in a dispute between two private parties and cannot justify
84. See wpm note 51 and accompanying text.
85. See L')retta v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982) (using
balancing test to distinguish between police power and taking in instances of government
intrusions short of permanent physical occupation).
86. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
87.Jd. at 123-24.
88. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 (198-l) (approving land
redistribution scheme designed to correct deficiencies in market to l:;nd oligopoly); see also G.
GlNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 486 (11th ed. 1985) ("What is a public rather than a private use
is often a fl>11ction of ... economic theory ...."); Merrill, The EconomICS of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 66-93 (1987) (discussing use of economics to define public use).
89. See SlApra text accompanying notes 58-68.
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the invasion of traditional property rights without compensation. 90 Therefore, applying the Coasian rule in such instances, even though it would not
promote economic efficiency, would facilitate the functional equivalent of
taking of private property without compensation. 91
Indeed, without a guarantee of improved economic efficiency,
whether a court could reassign the pr,'pel'ty right even with compensation
is problematic. The public use doctriue requires that the state take property
for a public rather than a private use. 92 Although judicial review of such
issues has been very deferential to the decisions of government,93 nonetheless, the court does require "a conceivable public purpose."94 Without an
assured result of increased economic efficiency, the total product rule lacks
public purpose and a court would not permit a reassignment of private
property rights to another private party.
In most regulatory taking cases the court reviews legislative actions. 95
Legislative enactments tend to confirm the substantial public interest claim,
because, unless a problem has become sufficiently pervasive, the legislature
would not likely deal with it. 96 In contrast, the Coasian approach would
90. CJ. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (preponderant public concern may arise
from need to preserve one set of private interests at expense of another).
91. The courts have clearly recognized the constitutional issues with regard to propeny
right reassignments made in the public interest. Lassiter v. Norfolk & C.R. Co., 126 N.C. 509,
36 S.E. 48 (1900), involved a railroad-farmer dispute similar to the hypothetical posed supra
text accompanying notes 41-46. The Lassiter coun, supporting a lower coun's decision to
reassign, in effect, the farmer's right to undamaged crops to the railroad on public policy
grounds, addressed the compensation issue:
Railroads are quasi public corporations, charged with important public duties,
which in their very nature necessarily invoke the power of eminent domain, and
therefore the courts, with practical unanimity, have created a species of legal
condemnation by the allowance of so-called "permanent damages." ... It is true that
the works of certain quasi public corporations are not liable to abatement on the
theory that to interfere with such workl; might seriously affect the proper performance of their public duties; but this does not exempt them from liability for any
unlawful damage .... [I]f [the railroad] takes the easement, it must pay for it.... Any
attempt to do [otherwise] would be unconstitutional.
126 N.C. at 512-15, 36 S.E. at 49,50 (emphasis added) (without affecting the coun's meaning,
the sequence of the sentences have been somewhat modified to facilitate the reader's
comprehension). For related analysis from this case, see supra note 83.
92. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1984) (discussing scope of
public use); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (rejecting claim of public
use for statute that granted mandatory access to railroad's propeny on behalf of private pany).
93. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("The role of the judiciary in
determining whether [the eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose is
an extremely narrow one."). Compare Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 1689, 1726 (1984) (takings jurisprudence has "a core of prohibited action that is more
sharply defined than anything under the contract or due process clauses.").
94. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
95. "[I1he necessity for appropriating private propeny for public use is not a judicial
question. This power resides in the legislature, and may be exercised by the legislature or
delegated by it to public officers." Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923). See
generally Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y. U. L. REv.
409 (1983).
96. Some writers in the area of public choice question whether the solutions offered by the
legislature are truly in the public interest. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCH, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); D. LEE & R. McKENZIE, REGULATING GoVERNMENT (1986);
Buchanan, Qpestfora Tempered Utopia, Wall St.J., Nov. 14,1986, at30, col. 4. Richard Epstein'S
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have the courts exercise what appears to be a nonjudicial regulatory
function in the context of two private parties bringing a property dispute to
the judiciary for resolution. These disputes do not guarantee the same
indicia of public interest that legislative actions do. Therefore, in these cases
the present law suggests that the parties be left as they were. 97
Whether the total product rule tends toward more economically
efficient rt::sults than the current police power/taking analysis is also
questionable, even by Posner's standards. In all those cases in which the
court would be at variance with Coase's results-that is, when the court
would find a taking98 -the court's determination mirrors more closely the
economic outcome that would have occurred absent transactions costs
barring negotiations. When the court finds a taking, the court, in effect,
assigns the property right to the party with the greater total product, that
is, the parties representing the public interest;99 to that extent, the court is
congruent with Coasian principles. Traditional taking law parts company
with Coase at this stage, however, because the finding of a taking requires
compensation, whereas the total product rule does not. 100 The court's
finding of a taking and ordering of compensation accomplishes the
economic t:quivalent of the parties privately negotiating in the absence of
transactions costs when the purchasing party buys the right because he
critique of modern takings doctrine shows a marked influence by public choice theory. See R.
EpsrEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (regulations,
ta.xcs, and modifications of liability rules must be included in takings analysis because "[t]hose
who are in control of the state will find in the unregulated forms of conduct effective
substitutes for those initiatives called into question under the takings clause."); id. at 104 ("The
current rela.x' d approach to regulation skews the incentives for political groups by making one
form of state action subject to powerful constitutional control while leaving its close substitutes
wholly unregulated."); see also id. at 161-81 (discussing and criticizing current public use
doctrine); Ep:itein, judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J. 711, 712 (1985)
("When the power of coalition, the power of artifice and strategy come into play, it often turns
out that legislatures reach results that (in the long as well as short run) are far from the social
optimum."). The claim made by public choice adherents, however, does not dispute the
proposition that the problems addressed by the legislature are affected with public interest.
Compare Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1133-35
(1986) (Constitution prohibits use of political power to implement "naked preferences" of
interest groups); Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1723-27 (consideration of "naked preferences"
prohibition in context of eminent domain and takings).
97. See H~waii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) ("the Constitution
forbids even a compensated taking of property when executed for no reason other than to
confer a priv~lte benefit on a particular private party.").
98. This, o)f course, does not include those cases in which the courts find that the
government's actions were solely for private purposes.
99. "When forced to [make] a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public." Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,
279 (1928) (government's requirement that private owners destroy cedar trees infected with
disease threatening apple industry was proper exercise of police power though not a taking).
"In determin1ng whether the taking of property is necessary for public use, not only the
pre'lent demands of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in the future, may
be considered." Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (citing Central Pac. Ry.
v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 309 (1907».
100. "rAJ strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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values it more. IOI Thus the court's traditional approach more accurately
mimics the marketplace without transactions costs than does Coase's total
product rule. I02
This result is not surprising, because in all taking cases, the court, in
effect, uses economic analysis via the balancing test it applies in making its
determination. The conclusion that a particular action constitutes a taking,
however, is not dictated by the court's use of economic analysis. The
conclusion is dictated instead by value judgments that can include economic
factors, but that are also based on principles of fairness and equity. In all
the taking cases, the court implicitly acknowledges that a barrier to
economic efficiency exists and that society'S efforts to overcome this barrier
must be judged by whether that attempt unfairly burdens one party with
the costs of overcoming the barrier. If the court finds a party has been
unduly burdened, the court does not sacrifice economic efficiency in the
name of justice, it merely requires that some other means of overcoming
the inefficiency must be found. In effect, the court chooses one of the
possible routes or channels to several of the possible states of economic
efficiency. Thus, the court's decision determines who will own society'S
resources and this decision stands on principles of equity.

D.

The Multiplicity of the Economically Efficient States

Perhaps the most fundamental flaw underlying the Coase-Posner
analysis is an implicit assumption that only one economically efficient state
exists. I03 This assumption is necessary to justify the reassignment of
property rights contrary to traditional property rules. Because Coase and
Posner view the economically efficient state as unique, they conclude that
any action that improves economic efficiency is unambiguously good for
101. Of course, when the negotiated outcome would have led to an apportionment of the
right between the parties, the court may be able only to estimate what that apportionment
might be. However, the court remains truer to the goals professed by Coase and Posner than
the wholesale uncompensated reassignment of the right that they recommend. See supra note
61 and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of another author's view that compensation is essential for economically efficient government exercise of eminent domain, see infra note 118.
103. Coase's general discussion with regard to "total effect," see Coase, supra note 2, at 42-44,
implies a belief in one unique maximum output. This is also a necessary assumption to make
in order for the conclusion of the Coase Theorem to be correct (i.e., that regardless of how
property rights are initially assigned, not only will they end up in the hands of the party who
values them the most but also that the economic outcome is unaffected by the assignment).
The conclusion of the Coase Theorem, as it was originally expressed, has since been disproved,
primarily by recognizing that, in any society, there are a multitude of different economically
efficient states that can be achieved from the same set of available resources. The text
immediately following this footnote explains why more than one efficient state is possible. For
further comments on the matter as it relates to the Coase Theorem, see Calabresi, supra note
40, at 69-70; Cooter, supra note 44, at 1-14 (discrediting Coasian conclusion that resource
allocation is invariant to assignment of liability.)
Posner more explicitly expresses his belief that there is a unique maximum total product.
For example, he writes" 'Wealth maximization' as a guide to governmental including judicial
action means that the goal of such action is to bring about the allocation of resources that
makes the economic pie as large as possible, irrespective of the relative size of the slices."
Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 131, 132
(1984).
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society.I04 They fail to recognize that a course of action that improves
economic efficiency may not be the only one that improves economic
efficiency, or even the one that society prefers. In fact, a fundamental
theorem of economics is that every society with a given amount of resources
faces a multiplicity of economically efficient states from which to choose; \03
th(! particu.lar efficient state toward which society gravitates reflects that
society's social values. The demonstration of the multiplicity of economically efficient states for a given amount of resources is most widely
displayed in the graphical analysis known as the Edgeworth-Bowley Box. \06
Stated simply, the Edgeworth-Bowley Box shows that whatever initial
distribution of goods exists in a given society, the members of that society
have an incentive to trade among themselves as long as each of the trading
partners wlnts more of one good than another and is willing to give up
other products in order to obtain additional quantities of that good. As long
as one party wants to give up a different good than the other party, and also
wants something the other party is willing to surrender, the potential for
trade exists. When the parties are no longer willing to trade because each
party no lo.ager will give up what the other party wants in exchange for his
or her goods, they have reached what is called economic efficiency.lo7
Clearly, the rate at which the parties will exchange, the amount they will
exchange, and when they will stop trading, is greatly affected by many
factors. Included among these factors are: the personal idiosyncracies of
the trading: partners with respect to the goods, the relative bargaining
strengths of the parties, and most importantly, their initial endowments of
wealth and resources. Obviously, if there are variations in any of these
factors. then the economically efficient state that society will reach will be
different.lo,~

104. "[RJedi;tribution is more effidendy carried out by the legislative branch .... [W]ealth
maximization IS the only social value ..• that courts can do much to promote." Posner, supra
note 103, at 133. "[\V]ealth-ma.ximization criterion ... requires, not that no one be made worse
off by the move, but only that the increase in value be sufficiendy large that the losers could
[but not neces:iarily would] be fully compensated." Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficimcy Norm in Common Law A.djudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 (1980).
103. The phrase "given amount of resources available" means that at any moment in time,
soci(·ty has a flllite amount of resources, such as land, labor, and capital, available to use as
inputs for production. Society can allocate this particular amount of resources in a vast variety
of ways, a large number of these ways being economically efficient. The text following this
footnote explains this point further.
101). See E. MANSfIELD, supra note 3, at 423-36; Bator, The Simple Anal)'tics of Welfare
Ma:,1mizal;0Il, 47 AM. ECON. REv. 22 (1975). For a detailed explanation of the EdgeworthBowley Box, s(:e infra note lOS.
107. If the leader refers back to the rancher-farmer hypothetical, set supra note 31 and
accompanying text, or the railroad-farmer hypothetical, see supra text accompanying notes
48-51, the rea,' er will see that the parties in each hypothetical negotiate until neither is willing
to "trade" (rig:1tS for catde or for crops or for rail services) any further. On that basis the
parties are deemed to have achieved economic efficiency, that is, when they have negotiated
for all the pot(·ntial gains from trade.
108. The Ecgeworth-Bowley Box is a conglomeration of various concepts designed to
dem(,nstrate the motives individuals have to trade and the factors determining the outer limits
of the extent of trading. The analysis is appropriate not only for understanding trade between
indh.cduals, but it also facilitates an appreciation for the optimal allocation of resources in an
economy. Sinc,~ the medium of expression is primarily a graphical analysis, the number of
factors that can be discussed in anyone exposition is limited. Therefore, the exposition here
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is confined to an analysis of the incentives to trade after the goods have been produced and
distributed. Readers interested in how the analysis applies to resource allocation should see E.
MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 427-34. For interesting applications of the Edgeworth-Bowley Box
analysis to legal issues, see Binningham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The
Geometry oj Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49, 53-58 (using Edgeworth-Bowley Box to explain
basis for contract); Westin, When One-E')'ed Accountants are Kings; A Primer on Microeconomics,
Income Taxes, and the Shibboleth oj E.fJzciency, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1099, 1102-09 (1985) (using
Edgeworth-Bowley Box to provide insightful perspectives on need to separate value choices
from economic efficiency analysis for purposes of evaluating tax policy).
The Edgeworth-Bowley Box analysis begins with several simplifying assumptions: there are
two individuals, Ann and Bill; two goods, meat and potatoes; and a finite quantity of each
commodity, e.g., 100 pounds of meat and 200 bushels of potatoes. Assume that there are
various levels of satisfaction Ann and Bill each derive from different quantities of consumption. Also assume that any given level of satisfaction can be achieved by differing combinations
of quantities of meat and potatoes. This is based on the assumption that there is always some
rate at which each individual is willing to substitute a portion of one commodity for a portion
of the other and be indifferent between the choice of consuming the combination after the
exchange or consuming the one prior to it.
By portraying a particular level of satisfaction with an analytic concept called an "indifference curve" in economics, the combinations of quantities of meat and potatoes that give the
individual the same level of satisfaction may be graphically represented. For example:
potatoes
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FIGURE 2

The curves labeled 11 are each, respectively, Ann and Bill's indifference curves. Points 1 and
2 on Ann's curve represent nvo different combinations of meat and potatoes that give Ann
equal levels of satisfaction. Any other point on the curve also represents a combination that
gives her the same level of satisfaction. Similarly, points 1 and 2 on Bill's indifference curve
give hint the same level of satisfaction, and so forth. Any point above and to the right of Ann's
11 curve represents a combination of goods that gives Ann a greater level of satisfaction than
any point on Ann's 11 curve. In a parallel fashion, any point below and to the left of Ann's 11
curve represents a combination of goods that gives Ann a lower level of satisfaction. Due to the
assumption of substitutability of one good for another, we know that for each combination of
goods, there are other combinations that yield equivalent levels of satisfaction. Therefore, if a
particular combination is not part of I}. then it is part of some other indifference cun·e. An
example of a combination yielding satisfaction greater than II is depicted on Ann's graph as
point 3 and the indifference curve with which it is associated is drawn on Figure 2 using
dashes. An example of a combination yielding less than II is depicted on Bill's graph as point
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While it may appear that economic factors alone determine the
4 with its a!.sociated indifference curve similarly plotted. Intuitively, one can see that there is
a whole n.nge of indifference curves for each individual, and that between any two
indifferenc(! curves there always lies a third that can be depicted if one chooses to do so. The
collection (If indifference curves for each individual is referred to as that individual's
"indifference map" and reflects that individual's tastes and preferences for meat relative to
potatoes at different levels of consumption.
The Edgeworth-Bowley Box is constructed by having Ann and Bill "face" each other
through their respective indifference curves within the framework of a box that represents all
the goods available for the two to consume. This is accomplished by "flipping" one of the
individual's indifference map, Bill's in this case, to face the other:
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The dimensions of the box represent the entire quantities of goods available for consumption
by the two individuals; the width of the box represents 200 bushels of potatoes and the height
of the box represents 100 pounds of meat. The construction of the box in this fashion is such
that any point in or on the box represents a complete distribution between Ann and Bill of all
the meat and potatoes available for consumption. For example, point F on the box represents
the allocation where Ann is endowed with all the available meat and no potatoes and Bill is
endowed with all the available potatoes and no meat. Point G, on the other hand, allocates all
the meat to Bill and all the potatoes to Ann. Thus, once an allocation is made (i.e., a point in
or on the boli. is selected) the only way Ann or Bill can improve their respective lots (short of
one expropri.lting goods from the other) is to trade with each other. Trading with each other
will only improve their lots if their preferences, given their endowments, are such that each is
willing to give' up some of what the other prefers in exchange for what the other prefers to give
up.
Such potential gains from trade can be more rigorously explained through the following
graphical analysis. Let E represent an initial endowment (arbitrarily chosen) for Ann and Bill,
when Bill's initial endowment is Bp bushels of potatoes and Bm pounds of meat, and Ann's is
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economically efficient state reached, in reality, the economically efficient
state reached results in large part from value choices that society makes with
respect to the initial endowments. Whether members of a society start out

Ap bushels and Am pounds. From their respective endowments Ann and Bill each derive their
own level of satisfaction, which is reflected in their respective indifference curves associated
with their endowments. These indifference curves are labeled IA (for Ann) and IB (for Bill).
Each can improve his or her lot by moving to a higher indifference curve, and the arrow on
each current indifference curve indicates the direction of increase for that individual. Any
point inside the intersection of the two initial indifference curves represents an allocation that
puts both Ann and Bill at higher levels of satisfaction, i.e., at higher indifference curves. For
example, point H is such a point, where the associated indifference curves have been partially
drawn. Since H is a point in the box, it is a feasible allocation and therefore a possible trading
result. Ann and Bill have an incentive to trade as long as at least one of them can improve his
or her welfare as a result. The incentive to trade ceases once no more such additional gains can
be made. Graphically, this occurs when Ann and Bill reach an allocation where their respective
indifference curves do not intersect but are, instead, tangent to each other. Point C represents
such a case, where again the indifference curves are partially drawn in. Clearly, no further
improvements can be made through trading at point C because, unlike at point H, in order for
one of the individuals to move to a higher curve, the other must necessarily move to a lower
one; this is the result of the absence of trading "space" between the two indifference curves.
In fact, between any two intersecting indifference curves there are a number of tangent
curves, thus making a number of ultimate trading outcomes possible. See, e.g., J. GOULD & C.
FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 423-27 (5th ed. 1980). Without more information about
Ann and Bill's bargaining skills, which trading outcome actually will occur cannot be
determined in advance. One can say unequivocally, however, that whatever trading outcome
will occur, it will lie within the intersection of the two indifference curves associated with the
initial endowments, i.e., within the area defined by the intersection of lA and lB.
From an economic standpoint, the initial endowment represented by E is inefficient. Both
Bill and Ann can each improve their well-being, at no cost to the other, by reallocating the
commodities between themselves, which they w.ill accomplish through trading. The movement
from point E to an ultimate trading point such as C represents an increase in efficiency, and
C is an efficient point. Moving from point E to point C, or any other efficiency point within
the trading space, is the same as ma.ximizing total product.
What Coase and Posner suggest, however, is not an efficiency move such as that from E to
C. Instead, they advocate a change in the initial endowment (e.g., taking the right away from
Ann and giving it to Bill), which is graphically the equivalent of moving, not from point E to
inside the trading space but from point E to a point such as K. They justify this transfer on the
grounds that, on some basis (usually by an evaluation using market prices), the gain to Bill
exceeds the loss to Ann. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18 (discussing problems of
using market prices to make such evaluations). Once such a reassignment is made, the trading
area is changed. The economy (in this case, comprised of Ann and Bill) will move to one of the
new set of efficient points, i.e., those contained within the intersection of the indifference
curves associated with point K. Thus, Coase and Posner's total product rule is not an effort to
move the economy from an inefficient point such as E to an efficient point within the
economy's trading area, such as C. Instead, the policy advocates changing the trading area,
which in turn changes the efficiency state toward which society itself is moving. Furthermore,
casual inspection of the graph makes it clear that the reassignment of the right not only favors
the assignee, Bill in this case, but the efficiency points that represent maximum total product
also favor Bill. In other words, if point E is viewed as the initial endowment according to
traditional property rules, which are based on principles of justice and fairness, the reassignment of the right according to the total product rule not only moves Ann and Bill to point K,
but it also assures that, whatever equilibrium society will now reach, it will be one in which Bill
is on a higher indifference curve and Ann is on a lower one than either of them would have
been on before.
For insightful analysis of other ramifications of the Coase-Posner total product rule, also
using the Edgeworth-Bowley Box, see Coleman, Effzciency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic
Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221 (1980); Coleman, EffICiency, Utility,
and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980).
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with equal or unequal shares of society's resources depends on that
particular society's view regarding the morality of different allocation
schemes. II)9 When Coase and Posner make their policy recommendations,
they claim merely to be interested in overcoming transactions costs barriers
that inhibit parties from freely negotiating to the economically efficient
outcome. 110 They believe they have accomplished this goal when they
provide an economic efficiency justification for reassigning property rights.
But reassigning property rights redistributes initial endowments and thus
constitute:; a value choice. Moreover, while the Coase-Posner choice in
reassigning rights may move society more readily toward an economically
efficient state, almost invariably that state will not be the same economically
efficient st.ate toward which society was moving before the property rights
were reassigned. This is because the Coase-Posner policy recommendation
operates only when it assigns rights differently from the way traditional
property rules assign them. III Thus, when Coase and Posner reassigr..
property lights, they implicitly make a value determination conCern;.11g
which economically efficient state that society will achieve. Although th'y
argue that economics dictates their assignment, in fact it does not.
Although Coase and Posner may grant that they have made a value
choice, they may still argue that it is better for society to move to a different
economically efficient state than to stagnate because transactions costs
render sodety unable to reach the economically efficient state toward which
it is currently moving. At the very least, though, that argument does not
preclude compensation for the party losing the right. As was shown earlier,
there are other ways of overcoming transactions costs that either do not
involve reassigning property rights (and thereby leave unchanged the
economically efficient state toward which society is moving) or that reassign
the property rights based on legal principles of equity and fairness. 112
Not only does the total product rule change the economically efficient
state toward which society moves, it also chooses one that favors the party
to whom Coase and Posner would reassign the right. Because this party has
more wealth than previously, the party has a greater effect on the choice of
109. Most notably, the existence of both a "capitalistic" distribution of private property
rights and a "socialistic" distribution of collective ownership reflects the sharp divergence of
wealth distributions that result from different moral principles governing who has the right to
own what. These differences in property rights also affect what is going to be produced and
who is going to receive it. The ultimate production and distribution of goods in each society
represents an efficient state that results from the initial distribution of resources. Different
initial distributions of resources lead to different economically efficient states. The criticisms
leveled by supporters of the capitalistic distribution of private property at the socialist
distribution of collective ownership really address the question whether the implementation of
the socialist values simultaneously erects barriers to the economy reaching the efficient state
as~eciated with its distribution scheme. This point, however, is often confused with the issue
of the economic merit of socialist values.
110. See Coase, sllpra note 2, at 16, quoted supra note 42; see also R. POSNER, supra note 54,
at 491:
We have seen that the ultimate question in many lawsuits is what allocation of
resource:; would maximize efficiency. The market normally decides this question, but
it is given to the legal system to decide in situations where the costs of a market
determination would exceed those of a legal determination.
Ill. See sllt'Ta text accompanying note 74.
112. See sllt'Ta text accompanying notes 75-83.
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production of goods and services than it did before. Thus, the makeup of
the economy's production will reflect the preferences of the newly endowed
individuals to a greater degree than before the reassignment, thereby
changing what constitutes maximum total product for that society. lIS In
other words, Coase and Posner's total product rule redefines the content of
maximum total product in favor of the parties to whom the rights have
been reassigned. 1I4
Coase and Posner's argument that their theory is the sole way to assure
maximization of total product stems from their belief that a unique
maximum total product exists. But as the analysis above demonstrates, a
multiplicity of maximum total products exists, each associated with a
different distribution of wealth embodying different societal value
choices.1I5 Thus society'S goal to maximize total product by reaching
economic efficiency is not synonymous with Coase and Posner's total
product rule. The latter simply chooses one particular kind of maximum
total product, a kind that may not accord with society's choices. 116
Another difficulty with the total product rule is that there are many
ways to measure improvements in economic efficiency. Coase offers no
analytical basis for ascertaining which improvement most benefits society.

113. Posner seems to acknowledge this point to some extent in Wealth Maximization and
Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 103. The article is a rejoinder to Samuels & Mescuro,
Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 107 (1984)r who make a
related observation on wealth-maximization and distribution throughout their article. Posner,
however, aJ>pears to be unconcerned with the implications and says:
This is true in the sense that the prices which determine value in a system dedicated
to wealth maximization depend ultimately on how wealth is distributed in the system;
there will be a different pattern of demands and therefore different prices if it is
highly concentrated than if it is highly equalized. But courts cannot do anything
about the distribution of wealth, so they might as well just take it for granted, as a
responsibility which the political system has allocated elsewhere.
Posner, supra note 103, at 133. However, Posner is wrong; the court does, in fact, do
something about distributional issues every time it makes a decision on right assignments.
Though explicit redistribution can be and is affected by other arms of the government (e.g.,
taxation and various income subsidies such as welfare and unemployment insurance), this does
not mean that distributional issues are not intricately involved in judicial disputes.
114. In recent years Posner has modified the arguments he uses to support his position,
presumably in response to criticisms questioning the veracity of many of his economic
assertions. He refined his posture to support an ethical norm he refers to as "wealthma.ximization." Fundamentally, he argues that all forms of voluntary transactions should be
permitted in society, including controversial ones such as selling babies, see Landes & Posner,
The Economics of the Bally Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), and slavery, see R. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF jUsrlCE 86 (1981). For a highly imaginative article that gives an insightful slant
on the true nature underlying Posner's notion of voluntary consent, see West, Authority,
Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985); see also Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free
Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1431 (1986); West, Submission, Choice, and
Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1449 (1986).
115. Accord Lachman, Knowing and Showing Economics and Law, 93 YALE LJ. 1587, 1595-98
(1984) (illustrating value-Iadden nature of "efficiency").
116. For an excellent analysis of society's choice of values as expressed through e.xisting
restrictions on liability and entitlements, see generally Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1985).
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In fact, the determination of the preferred improvement requires consideration of noneconomic social values.
It is often argued that society's preferences can be ascertained in a
scientific manner by examining the market prices established for the
various ~roods the economy produces. 1l7 This argument asserts that the
market prices reflect not only the costs of production of these goods but
also society's demand for them. In other w·ords, if many members of society
want a particular good and want it to a great extent, they will offer to pay
higher prices to secure it. Thus, it is argued that the prices people are
willing to pay for the good reflect how much value they receive from it.
However, people's willingness to pay for a product is not determined by
their desire for the good alone; the wealth and income of each individual
also affects it. Even though two persons may have equal desires for a
particulai: commodity, if one is wealthy and the other is not, clearly, at some
price the wealthy person will still purchase the good, but the other one will
not. Since society is comprised of people of varied tastes, different distributions of wealth will give different people greater power to affect prices
and then!fore production in the market. Any given set of prices found in
any given marketplace reflects the tastes and preferences of society under
the given distribution of wealth and income. I IS
It is debatable whether the use of these prices as the measure of
potential social improvement is appropriate when evaluating a policy that
proposes to redistribute initial endowments. Any change in the distribution
of wealth necessarily changes the market prices. If market prices are used
to assess the improvements, they should at least be the ones established
after the redistribution occurs, not the prices from before the redistribution. Even this, however, does not answer the question whether the
redistribution improves social welfare, since that answer requires a subjec117. See, t.g., Muris & McChesney, The Effects of Advertising on the D..Jv.zlity of Legal Services, 65
A.B.A. J. !!i03, 1504 (1979) (society's preferences in legal services should be determined by
price consumers are willing to pay); Note, An Economic Analy;is of Tort Damages for Wrongful
Dtath, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113 (1985) (individual preferences should determine efficient price
for a life in wrongful death actions).
118. Professor Durham makes a related point regarding the appropriateness of using
market pric.~s to determine the required compensation for takings. See Durham, EfflCientJust
CompensatiOll as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1277, 1278-79 (1985). He argues
that market price~ tend to understate the true cost to the owner of a taking and as a result lead
to an inefficient use of the government's right of eminent domain. Durham's efficiency
analysis is r·~miniscent of Pigou's (i.e., it rests primarily on the view that all costs should be
internalized, see supra text accompanying notes 19-25), and thus reflects a belief (somewhat
similar to Coase's and Posner's) that only a single economically efficient state exists. In not
recognizing the multiplicity of economically efficient states, see supra note 108 and accompanying text, hoth perspectives fail to recognize the true purpose of the eminent domain right
and the judicial process that constrains it. Durham's approach is designed to preserve the
existing distribution and the efficient states associated with it. Coase and Posner's approach
changes the distribution radically without acknowledging the equity issues involved. The
traditional judicial analysis of police power, however, implicitly recognizes that a multiplicity
of efficient states exists and that states change as society and the economy changes. Therefore
under such drcumstances the government and the courts appropriately consider a reordering
of the wealth distribution, which benefits society as a whole, but they do so only under the
strictest guidelines designed to preserve constitutionally protected rights and the principles of
fairness and equity. See supra text accompanying notes 84-102.
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tive judgment that transcends market prices. Finally, these market prices
reflect private decisions made without consideration of greater societal
implications. Therefore, when policymakers consider proposals for social
change they evaluate benefits that do not currently exist in the marketplace.
Since the market prices have been established without considering those
benefits and their distributional impact, the market prices present a
distorted picture of the value of those benefits. Consequently, the use of the
marketplace as a measure of improvements for social change is not a
value-free indicator and should be used with considerable caution.

III.

COASE IN THE COURTS

The basic thrust of Coase's approach is that economic considerations
can and should be dispositive in resolving legal disputes. His analysis
implies that the attainment of economic efficiency is not only essential but
also sufficient for assuring societal well being. Coase's analysis in his article
assesses welfare solely by the increase achieved in the quantity of goods and
services as measured by market prices. His examples and analytical discussions rely on this market method of measuring improvements in societal
welfare. 119 In the article's final section, however, Coase acknowledges that
"the choice between different social arrangements for the solution of
economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than ... [the
market value of production] and that the total effect of these arrangements
in all spheres oflife should be taken into account."120 Coase did not resolve
this basic tension between economic determinism and broader social goals.
His successors have largely ignored this aspect of his discussion, focusing
instead on remedies that use the parameters of the marketplace as the sole
measurement of increases in society's welfare. Because these supporters
view market prices as an expression of society'S values, they believe they
have found a value-free way of applying economic analysis to ..achieve the
unique solution to maximizing social welfare. 121 As previously noted,
however, market prices may not accurately reflect society'S preferences for
the assignment of property rights, thus the use of market prices may
constitute a value choice at odds with societal mores. 122 Moreover, effi119. See Coase, supra note 2, at 43 ("In this article the analysis has been confined, as is
common in this pan of economics, to comparisons of the value of production, as measured by
the market.").
120. See id. Even though Coase adds these few sentences toward the end of his article
acknowledging the importance of including dimensions other than economic efficiency in
social policy decisions, this disclaimer is gready overshadowed by the article's pervasive tone
proclaiming that economic efficiency is a sufficient goal in itself.
121. See R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 10 (" 'Efficiency' means e.xploiting economic resources
in such a way that 'value' - human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay
for goods and services-is maximized."); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 96 (1986) ("Most investors need not expend resources on
search; they can accept the market price as given and purchase at a 'fair price.' "). But see
Levmore, Explaining Restitution,.71 VA. L. REv. 65, 75 (1985) ("So any attempt to resolve the
conflict between D and E through a cost-benefit analysis based on a single set of market prices
will inevitably be distorted.").
122. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18; see also Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical
Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 700 (1985) ("[f]hey pretend
neutrality by 'balancing' [interests]. But whereas the value choice in a 'balancing' test is fairly
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ciency analysis alone does not determine a unique solution to legal disputes.
Economic efficiency analysis will only reveal the existence of a multiplicity
of economically efficient states-it wiII not reveal which one of those states
is most desirable or beneficial to society. That choice must be made
pursuant to a value system based on society's morals, ethics, and legal
principles, none of which market prices accurately reflect. 123 By mingling
economic analysis and value choices, Coase and his proponents have
obfuscated the real virtue of economic analysis, which is to discern what the
economically efficient choices are rather than which efficiency choice to
make.
Interestingly, in spite of the presentation by Coase and his supporters
of economic analysis as determinative in legal disputes. the courts intuitively recognize the true analytical usefulness of economic reasoning. 124 An
examination of the judicial opinions that cite Coase directly makes this
point particularly clear. In those seventeen cases 125 the courts consciously

obvious, cost-benefit analysts can smuggle in their preferences and thus give their tinkering
with the e:{isting distribution of wealth the sham rigor of scientific rationality.").
123. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
AMERICi\l'l LAw 80-93 (1984) (economic analysis can be used to support different political
view~).

12·1. One clear example of the judiciary's awareness of the distinction between using
economic analysis to discover an efficient means to a chosen end, and using it to make value
choices, can be found in a presentation on the responsibilities of regulatory agencies made
recently by Supreme Court Justice, then-Judge, Antonin Scalia, at a conference sponsored by
the University of Houston Law Center. A former University of Chicago Law School professor,
Justice Scalia has frequently expressed interest in the nexus oflaw and economics. During his
presentation, he emphasized that value choices are subjective decifions that cannot be made
through any process of economic determinism. He asserted that economic reasoning can and
should be used to assist in the discovery of what those value choices might be, but ultimately
the determination of choice must be based on principles other than economic reasoning. He
argued thai in the area of administrative law, the responsibility of making these value decisions
lies with the appropriate regulatory agency and, therefore, the court should exercise great
deference. Justice Scalia gave two examples: one in which the regulatory agency gives an
erroneous ('conomic argument to justify i~ chosen means, and the other in which the agency
is faced with two competing value choices. These examples, he claimed, demonstrate when the
court should and should not interfere with the agency's determination.
[For example, if the agency chooses not to reduce a regulatory constraint because]
the agency's prediction [is] that . . . although [relaxing the constraint] will save
materid costs, we can't be sure that the manufacturer will pass thOle material costs on
to the consumer even though the market is fiercely competitiye[,] I guess that that
really ,"ould have finally pushed me over the edge and I would have said that is a
prediction not even a mother could love....
[On the other hand, t]he outcome of cost benefit analysis in the broad sense ... is
particularly difficult for a court to second guess when it inyolves weighing the impact
of a proposed action upon two quite different social values. For example, ... aesthetic
values versus full employment, or minor health risk versus low consumer prices. How
can on(' say, except at the remote margins, that a particular call is right or wrong
when you are weighing apples or oranges.
Addrer.s by Judge Antonin Scalia, University of Houston Law Center Conference Rethinking
Tort and Enviromelltal Liability Laws: Needs and Objectives ofthe Late 20th Century and Beyond (Apr.
18, 1986) [hereinafter Scalia Address]; see also Scalia, Responsibilities ofRegulating Agencies Under
Envirollmentt!l Laws, 24 Hous. L. REv. 97, 100-01 (1987) (revised remarks).
125. To research the impact of Coase's article, The Problem of Social Cost, mpra note 2, on the
courts I employed a computer search to retrieve every case citing the name "Coase" since 1960
(the year in which his article was published). As of August 14, 1986, the search revealed 21

ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON MAN

613

use economic analysis, yet most courts reject economic determinism and
base their decisions on other factors.
These seventeen cases represent a microcosm of the extent to which
courts use economic reasoning in their legal analysis. Some make merely
incidental use of economic analysis, others use economic reasoning as an
integral part of the judicial analysis; in two, the courts appear to use
economics as determinative in reaching their conclusions. In every case,
though, the courts had to resort to broader social policies to make their
decisions.

A.

Conventional Uses of Economic Analysis

At one end of the spectrum are those cases in which economic analysis
does not playa maJor role in either the court's reasoning or in its ultimate
conclusion.1 26 For example, the United States Supreme Court majority
opinion in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 127 seems steeped in
economic analysis because it considers a great number of economic factors.
However, the majority's analysis draws very little from the process of
economic reasoning. On the other hand, economic reasoning plays a
significant role in the arguments of the dissent. Economic factors are data
about goods and services being produced,128 while economic reasoning is

cites from both federal and state courts. Two cites were discarded because they merely referred
to Coase in the title of an article by another author. Two were reported too late to include in
this analysis.
126. Ironically enough, Judge Posner's opinion for the panel decision in Analytica, Inc. v.
NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983), illustrates such de minimis use of
economic reasoning. The court had to decide whether the plaintiffs law firm, which once
assisted in the transfer of stock from the defendant corporation to its (now former) employee,
should be barred from the current case on the grounds that a law firm may not represent an
adversary of its former client if the subject matter is substantially related. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9(a) (1983); see also International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527
F.2d 1288, 1292 (2d Cir. 1975) (counterclaim against plaintiff for attorneys' fees did not
render firm counsel to plaintiffs, so firm was not disqualified from representing defendants);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975)
(prior association with firm representing defendant did not disqualify attorney representing
plaintiff); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973) (previous
representation of defendant disqualified counsel representing plaintiffs in patent litigation).
Although the law firm had been the sole legal representative in the prior transaction between
the defendant corporation and its employee, the law firm argued that its actual client was the
employee and not the defendant corporation. Judge Posner responded that this contention
was irrelevant because, in effect, all parties engaged the firm and had done so for economic
reasons, i.e., to save on attorneys' fees. He cited Coase's article with a if. signal to support the
proposition that conducting a transaction at a lower cost benefited everyone. In affirming the
lower court's disqualification order, however, Judge Posner stated that whatever entity
employed the law firm in this previous transaction was in fact irrelevant to the legal issue.
Precedent dictated that the law firm's access to confidential information of the defendant
corporation would be the crucial factor. See 708 F.2d at 1268-69. Thus, the court's invocation
of economic reasoning comprised a minor portion of the opinion, and it essentially played no
role in reaching the result. Furthermore, the economic analysis itself was little more than an
application of common sense and the cite to Coase's article was more ritualistic than
appropriate.
127. See 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
128. Courts routinely use economic factors to assist in determining issues such as the
measure of damages. For instance, the reduction of a future income stream to present value
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an analytical process characterizing behavior and decisionmaking in response to various incentives. United Housing addresses whether stock issued
by a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation constitutes securities within
the meaning of the Security Act of 1933. 129 Both the majority and the
dissent consider a number of different factors, including the economic issue
of whether the particular stock in question was purchased for the purpose
of earning profits. The majority looks at whether meaningful profits could
be earned by the stock, whether the stock could be sold at an appreciated
value, and whether there was a legal basis for considering tax savings and
below-market rents a form of earning profits. The majority answers the
questions l:legatively and concludes that the stock is not a security for the
purposes of the Act.130 Although the majority looks at economic aspects of
the problem, it does not engage in economic reasoning. Justice Brennan's
dh,sent argues that earning profits can take forms other than capital
appreciation and participation in earnings. Drawing on economic reasoning, his dissent points out that an investor makes no distinction between tax
savings and after-ta."{ income, and therefore money saved is just as much a
form of profit as money earned. lSI This analysis is a type of economic
reasoning because it assists the Court in recognizing the similarities
between seemingly disparate forms of transactions based on their economic
realities. m
Similarly, in Powers v. United States Postal Service,133 the economic
reasoning is not as intrinsic to the judicial analysis as in other cases, though
its role is qualitatively greater and more integral to the decision than in
United Housing. Judge Posner addresses the question whether state law or
federal common law governs lease disputes between the United States Post
Oftice and landlords. The particular dispute before the court involved a
landlord in Indiana seeking to terminate a long-term lease with the Post
Office in which the rents, due to inflation, were particularly favorable to the
Post Office and unfavorable to the landlord. 134
Proceeding under the assumption that application of state law would
cause the Post Office to lose its favorable lease,135 Judge Posner evaluates a

requires application of many economic factors that affect the value of future income. See jones
& Laughlin S):eel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 538·53 (1983).

129. See 421 U.S. at 840.
130. See id. at 840·60.
131. See id. at 863·64 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
132. The dissent cites Coase in addition to P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (9th ed. 1973), for the
proposition tj-,at ventures undertaken for the purpose of generating tax savings are as much
a form of income as participation in a venture that generates earnings or capital appreciation.
There could be no more appropriate supporting source for that proposition than the eminent
Ecollomics, a mainstay economics textbook which has been used around the world for over forty
years in major universities. Coase's article, on the other hand, though it uses elementary
economic analysis, is not concerned with, nor does it make any comment on the issue of
savings versus earnings. It is not clear why the author of the opinion, justice Brennan, chose
Coa~e's article as supplementary support for the proposition.
1:13. 671 F.~!d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982).
1:14. See id . .it 1041·42.
135. Posner makes this assumption in order to examine the arguments for application of
federal common law in a light most favorable to them. Later in the opinion, after determining
that state law should apply, Posner gives some arguments why state law would not dictate
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number of reasons that would justify applying federal common law.
Supreme Court doctrine on the choice of federal common law compels
Posner to consider whether the Postal Service requires nationally uniform
or distinctive treatment in its leases, whether the state law intentionally
discriminates against the Postal Service or threatens its effectiveness, and
whether the application of federal common law would reduce the Postal
Service's cost of operation. 13&
Judge Posner applies economic reasoning to answer the last ques- .
tion. 137 He argues that even if the application of federal common law would
avoid the loss of low rent resulting from an eviction, this cost savings would
only be in the short run. Landlords, Judge Posner says, would charge the
federal service higher rents to compensate for differences in their rights
under federal versus state laws. 13S In this view, not only would application
of federal common law generate no cost savings,139 but, Judge Posner
(incorrectly) argues, average rents would also likely be lower if state law
were applied. 140
Judge Posner finds the other arguments favoring federal common law,
such as those stemming from the concern for national uniformity and
avoidance of discriminatory treatment, also unpersuasive. 141 Furthermore,
he contends that federal common law on landlord-tenant relations does not
exist,142 and that its application would require the federal courts to fashion
one, a task that he thinks the federal courts would not do well. 143 As a
result, Judge Posner decides that state law should apply.l44
Though economic analysis does not comprise a major portion of the
opinion, Judge Posner uses fairly sophisticated economic reasoning to
address an issue he feels is important. He engages in a market analysis
(albeit, an incorrect one l45 ) to determine a priori whether the cost of postal
termination of the lease. He remands the case to the lower court for a hearing on this issue.
See id. at 1044-46.
136. See id. at 1044-45.
137. In fact, Judge Posner considers the issue of reduction in costs before considering any
of the other issues. This may reflect the primacy of the economic issues in his thinking. See id.
at 1044.
138. See id.
139. See id. (Posner cites Coase with a "cJ." signal for support though connection is not
readily apparent).
140.Judge Posner's economic reasoning is wrong because rents would go up only in those
states in which federal common law is less protective of landlords than state law. In those states
where federal law is more restrictive on the tenant, the rents should actually go down. Without
exhaustive information about the actual impact in each state, it is impossible to predict
whether application of federal common law would in fact raise or lower costs for the Postal
Service, indicating again the problem arising from focusing solely on the parties to the dispute.
Posner certainly has not found, as he implies, see id. at 1045, any a priori reason for believing
that costs will move in one direction or the other.
141. See id.
142. See id. Though Posner cites United States v. Certain Property in Manhattan, 306 F.2d
439, 444 (2d Cir. 1962), in support of this assertion, he does not reconcile the claim with the
lower court's finding that since the Postal Service was subject to federal common law, it was not
owed the painting services from the landlord.
143. See 671 F.2d at 1046.
144. See id.
145. See supra note 140.
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services would be affected by the decision. He does not, however, draw
e::clusively on his economic conclusion for the disposition of the case as a
whole. He considers a number of factors other than economic ones that
concern both the Postal Service's ability to function and the federal court's
ability to rule. 146
Whether Judge Posner would have resolved the case the other way had
he found a real cost saving in applying federal common law is unclear. He
observes that any cost savings to the Postal Service is due solely to a
redistribution from the general taxpayer to the Indiana citizen and not
from a lo\vering of social costs. Savings of social costs arise from efficiency
gains and usually are reflected in lower costs of production. The cost
savings to the Postal Service in Powe-rs would result from a reallocation of
those costs to different parties. Posner concludes, therefore, that a reallocation of costs alone does not justify a finding in favor of federal common
law since it would generate no net change in societal welfare. 147 Whether
Judge Posner finds economic efficiency determinative in deciding legal
disputes, however, is not discernable here; his findings on the other legal
factors alw support the use of state law. Absent finding an improvement in
economic efficiency to support a particular decision, Judge Posner considers legal factors and legal reasoning necessary to his decision.
The economic reasoning used in the Powers case is not transcending; it
is one consideration in a multifaceted judicial approach that weighs all
factors equally in reaching a conclusion. Powers is thus materially distinguishable from those cases in which economic analysis forms the core of the
court's reasoning process. The centrality of the economic reasoning may
not be immediately apparent in each of these cases, because much of the
analysis i~ of a kind used both in economics and in law. Many areas of the
law evolved reasoning processes identical to those developed by economists
to resolve similiar issues. 148 One such example emerges in Nelson v. United

146. See 671 F.2d at 1044-45. These factors include whether or not state law would be
sufficient to deal with the intricacies of federal programs, whether there would be discrimination toward federal programs under state law and, finally, whether there would be problem~
with uniformity across state lines.
147. See U1. at 1044. Posner makes a value judgment when he concludes rJIat a redistribution
alone does not represent a change in societal welfare. To see this, imagine that Indiana is.
c(.incidentally, the richest state in the nation and that Indiana's landlords are the nation'!,
\'/I:althiest landlords. If the costs are redistributed away from the less advantaged average
tal:payer ar d charged to the better-off Indiana landlord, even though actual costs are
unchanged, under some value systems society's welfare is still improved. Judge Posner'~
implicit value system in Powers is that interpersonal transfers of wealth have no impact on the
measure of society'S welfare regardless of the equity, or lack of equity, in the initial
endowment'!.
148. The best known examples of the similarities between legal reasoning and economic
reasoning are the balancing test, the cost-benefit analysis, the theories of accident reduction,
and the theories of deterrence. These cover a broad spectrum of legal fields. See, e.g"
McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme C()urt's Unanswered QyJestions and
Qu.estiunable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 49 (1985) (discussing Court's use of cost-benefit
analysis to evaluate professional advertising); Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence
in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. REv. 343, 349 (1982) (mentioning significance of accident
reduction in theory of strict liability); Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 713, 774 (1986) (noting importance of deterrence in antitlust enforcement); Note,
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States,149 in which the focus is on the reduction of the risk of accidents. Since
the legal and economic communities each have addressed the problem of
risk reduction, it is not surprising that the two disciplines have developed
essentially the same analysis. Risk reduction is, however, only one possible
policy approach that a court might take when resolving accident disputes;
other alternative approaches also are av2ilable.l 50 Accident disputes are
not the only legal issues for which a menu of policy choices exists.
Competing policy considerations often face a court when it resolves any
particular dispute. Only some of these policies require the kind of reasoning used in economics in order to reach an appropriate result. When the
court makes a decision to emphasize one policy over another, it chooses to
favor the societal concerns promoted by that policy over those of the
alternatives. The policy chosen may, by its very nature, call for the
application of economic analysis to resolve the dispute. This is not the same
as the Coase-Posner view that courts should endeavor wherever possible to
apply economic reasoning to each case in order to determine the "unique
efficient resolution."I5I
In Nelson v. United States,I52 the court is quite conscious that it might
have to choose between possibly competing social values. The court focuses
on whether, under the Restatement of Torts, an owner's duty to protect
"others" from unreasonable risks of harm includes liability for harm caused
to the employees of a hired independent contractor. I53 Two competing
concerns trouble the court. One is that allowing the employee to file a
traditional tort claim against a fortuitous third party owner would permit
the possible circumvention of workers' compensation laws limiting damages
for job-related injuries. I54 The other is the need to minimize the risk of
accidents. I55 A resolution of the dispute in favor of the first concern
employs a statutory analysis to determine whether in fact the employee in
question is subject to the restrictions of workers' compensation laws. I56 To
Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 BARV. L. REv. 450, 466 (1985) (relating ad
hoc balancing approach to political asylum law).
149.639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980).
.
150. See infra notes 212, 238 and aa::ompanying te),."t.
151. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing multiplicity of economically
efficient states).
152.639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980).
153. See id. at 474 (interpreting REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965».
154. Seeid. at 475.
155. The coun recognizes that it is "choosing between a policy designed to reduce injuries
by providing for the contractor's and owner's clear allocation of safety responsibilities, on the
one hand, and the avoidance of perverse or fonuitous liability for injury on the other." Id.
156. One problem is that the deceased employee had a possible cause of action against two
different parties based on three different theories. First, he was entitled to a limited recovery
from his direct employer, the independent contractor, based on the workers' compensation
laws. Second, he had a possible cause of action against the general contractor, the government,
on a theory of general negligence. Finally, as a seaman he may have had a statutory remedy
under the Jones Act. The coun worried that allowing the employee to recover from both the
independent contractor and the general contractor would allow all injured employees of
independent contractors to recover more than that permitted by the policies underlying the
worker's compensation law. Thus, merely by vinue of a peculiar position of employment, the
employee of the independent contractor could circumvent the workers' compensation
restrictions.
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choose instead a policy of accident avoidance entails examining the
particular facts and circumstances concerning the third party owner's
knowledge, expertise, and capacity to contribute in any meaningful way
toward avoiding the harm. This analysis, unlike the statutory interpretation, focm es on the relative capacities of individuals to affect the probability
that certain events will occur and it is the kind of analysis engaged in by
economists when dealing with problems of accident reduction. 157
The Nelson court first chooses to emphasize the policy of accident
avoidance. It finds that holding the third party liable would not contribute
to safety under the particular circumstances of the case. I5S The court
implicitly acknowledges its application of economic reasoning to this issue
by citing the work of Guido Calabresi, another advocate of the application
of the use of economics in law. 159 The court does not, however, rely
exclusively on accident reduction analysis. It intenveaves its findings with
other policy considerations, including the validation of the distinction
between employers and independent contractors and the preservation of
private contractual relationships.160 The court concludes that making the
third party liable would undermine those interests without leading to any
safety benefits and is therefore not justified. 161 The court further buttresses
its arguments by noting that its decision avoids compromising the workers'
compensation scheme. 162 Thus, although the court elects to emphasize a
policy that. uses economic analysis, its ultimate decision rests on the social
ramifications of different policy choices. 163
157. For some economic discussions of accident reduction, see A. POLll\SKY, .AN INTRODUCTION TO Ecol>mncs AND LAw 37-49 (1983).
158. The c·)un decides against holding the defendant liable because there was no evidence
that the defendant was "in a better position ... to foresee and evaluate the best methods of
protection" in comparison to the independent contractor's special expertise on the subject. See
63!! F.2d at 478.
159. See id. (citing G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL A.'1D ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970».
160. See id.
161. See id. at 479.
162. The trial court believed that its decision did not compromise the worker's compensatioll scheme because the decedent was eligible for extra remedies under the Jones Act by vinue
of his status as seaman. The appellate coun points out the trial coun's error by showing that
the decedent did not have a Jones Act remedy in this case because the government was the
defendant and is exempt from Jones Act liability under the Suits in Admirality Act. See id. at
478-79.
163. Another group of opinions which concern used goods dealers demonstrate the use of
economic reasoning to lay bare value choices even when the choices are not limited to ones of
economic dimensions. Economic reasoning also discerns policies relating to fairness and
equity. As JUitice Scalia noted, cost benefit analysis "is even helpful when one is not dealing
with economic matters." See Scalia Address, sufrra note 124. In these cases the courts consider
wh.:ther the application of strict liability to used goods should be the same as for new goods
dealers. Based on a variety of policy considerations, the courts choose to circumscribe strict
liability'S application, albeit in varying degrees.
By its very nature, the application of strict liability calls for economic reasoning because strict
liability is a policy decision to interfere with the marketplace. See gmeraUy Spence, Consumer
Misperceptions. Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977). The
doctrine serv'~s to'insure that certain standards of quality, durability, and safety are met by
threatening enterprises with liability for damages if they fail to meet these standards. See
Turner v. Int·~rnational Harvester Co., 133 N.]. Super. 277, 289, 336 A.2d 62, 69 (1975). The
doctrine also assures access to compensation for victims of defective products. See id. For
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B. Judicial Innovation Through Economic Reasoning
Cost savings and risk reduction typically call for an economic approach
and thus Powers and Nelson are good examples of conventional uses of

further discussion of policy considerations underlying strict liability, see W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 19, at 692-93. The doctrine, however, has the economic effect of higher
prices because manufacturers incur greater costs in meeting higher standards and providing
funds to satisfy any claims.
Although strict liability could be analyzed from an equitable perspective alone, the courts in
the three cases discussed here use the economic aspects of strict liability as an analytical starting
point. Actually the two 1ater opinions both quote a passage from Turner characterizing
enterprise liability in this fashion. Enterprise liability is a policy of applying strict liability to all
costs, direct and indirect, associated with a good distributed by an enterprise. Pigou's policy of
internalization of all costs is consistent with enterprise liability, both of which impliedly adopt
a policy of preserving initial ownership rights. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24; see also
supra note 1l8. The passage from Turner inappropriately cites Coase for support of the
economic justification of enterprise liability, which is ironic since Coase wrote his article with
the specific purpose of destroying the economic validity of the Pigouvian approach.
The courts begin their analysis by considering whether strict liability should be applied to
insure that consumer expectations with repect to used goods are met. Turner v. International
Harvester, 133 NJ. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975), rather cursorily concludes that public
concerns for safety (but not quality or durability) mandate that '~ustifiable safety expectations"
be met, holding that used goods dealers are liable if their goods prove to be "unreasonably
dangerous." See id. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69.
In Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979), the court agrees
with the Turner court but decides against the imposition of strict liability without regard to the
defendant's ability to affect the risk. See id. at 753-54,596 P.2d at 1302-03. Its decision is pased
on what the court perceives would be the economic effect otherwise. The court reasons that
imposition of strict liability to assure safety when used goods dealers could not affect the risk
of accident would unduly restrict the flexibility of used goods businesses to make available a
variety of goods under a variety oftenns. See id. at 755,596 P.2d at 1303. The value to society
of such flexibility in used goods markets outweighs the merits of compensation for the victims
when the used goods dealer could not in any way affect the risk of hann. See id. at 756, 596
P.2d at 1303-04. In discerning that the imposition of strict liability might cost society the use
of an essential feature of used goods markets, the Tillman court uses economic analysis to
recognize all policy choices confronting it-the continuing flexibility of used goods markets as
well as compensation for victims.
The courts in these cases also use economic reasoning to discern issues of equity. In
Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789
(1980), the court, using an economic anaylsis similar to TiUman, argues that imposing strict
liability on the used goods dealer who has no control over product safety works at irrational
cross purposes with the objectives of strict liability policy. The court concludes that when the
used goods dealer can not affect the level of safety and it could not pass the costs of strict
liability to the responsible manufacturer, imposing strict liability would work an injustice. See
id. at 283, 161 CaI.Rptr. at 798.
In a similar vein, the Turner court uses economic reasoning to ascertain the equity of
allowing the used goods dealer to escape liability if the good is sold with an "as is" disclaimer.
See 133 NJ. Super. at 292,336 A.2d at 70-71. The Turner court applies economic analysis to
demonstrate that various factors would affect the parties' relative bargaining position. That
analysis pennits the court to find that the usual presumption, i.e., that the parties to an
exchange are the ones best able to detennine its value, maybe inoperative. See 133 NJ. Super.
at 293-94, 336 A.2d at 71. The Turner court thereby concludes that when the parties are in an
unequal bargaining position to the disadvantage of the customer, it would be unfair to allow
an "as is" disclaimer to isolate the used goods dealer from damages for which he would
ordinarily be liable. See 133 N.J. Super. at 295, 336 A.2d at 72. By examining the possibility
of control by the used goods dealer and the factors affecting the bargaining outcomes, the
court is able to recognize issues of equity even when they are of a noneconomic dimension.
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economic reasoning by the COUrts. l64 In Webster v. City of Houston 165 and
White Lake Improvement Association v. Whitehall,166 on the other hand, the
courts' use of economic analysis is not traditional. One issue is particularly
noneconomic, and another issue, though containing an economic component, is traditionally analyzed from a noneconomic perspective. In these
cases the courts' applications of economic analysis are more innovative and
novel.
In Webster the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to uphold ajury
award of punitive damages against a city police department for tacirly
encouraging police officers to use excessive force. 167 Webster, a teenager,
was shot and killed by the police after surrendering to them at the end of
a car chase. Officers placed a gun by Webster's side to make it appear that
he was armed. This act was not an isolated incident but a general policy of
cover-up condoned by the Houston Police Department and widely practiced throughout the Houston Police force. 16S The court interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 169 as
precluding punitive damage awards except in egregious circumstances not
present in the instant case. 170
Judge Goldberg, in a specially concurring opinion, disagreed with the
view that Newport permitted punitive damages in egregious circumstances,
arguing that if it did, the Websfe1' case would surely qualify.l7l Judge
Goldberg criticizes the Supreme Court's opinion in Newport as overly
broad. 172 In his view, Newport rests on the premise that awarding punitive
damages against a municipality has no deterrent effect on governmental
misconduct. Judge Goldberg agrees that this rationale supported the
Newport ruling because the case involved only a single instance of misconduct by individual high-level government officials (i.e., the mayor and the
city council). In such cases, punitive damages would not deter the municipality because the individuals engaged in the misconduct do not pay the
damages. That rationale, Judge Goldberg argues, does not work when the
misconduct involves a pervasive governmental policy supported by collective action o~er time. 17:! Damages can have a deterrent effect in that case
because the taxpayers will demand a change in governmental policy if the
cost of the damage payments becomes excessive. Only by weighing the
policy's benefits (i.e., encouraging aggressive police action to reduce crime)
against its true costs (i.e., the killing of innocent people) will the government "promote socially correct decisionmaking."174 In the Webster situation,
164. The issues in Tillman. Tauber-Arons, and Turner-victim compensation. unequal bargaining positions. satisfaction of e';pectations, continued existence of markets. as well as risk
reduction-also evoke traditional economic analysis.
165.689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982). affd on reh'g. 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984).
166.22 Mich. App. 262. 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
167. See 689 F.2d at 1223.
168. See id. at 1221-23.
169.453 U.S. 247 (1981).
170. See 689 F.2d at 1229.
171. See id. at 1231 (Goldberg. J .• concurring).
172. See id. (Goldberg.] .• concurring).
173. See id. at 1236 (Goldberg.j.. concurring).
174. See id. at 1237 (Goldberg.J .• concurring).
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not all instances of the harm caused by the policy are litigated because not
all instances of the cover-up are detected. Since compensating damages
punish the government only for harm for which it "got caught," the
government is not forced to consider the true costs of its policies. 175 In this
situation, Judge Goldberg argues, punitive damages serve a deterrent
function because government pays for the undetected harm.176 Thus
punitive damages can serve to internalize the full costs of harmful acts
which, after all, is a proper function of damages.
Judge Goldberg's use of economic analysis is innovative. Only recently
have economists turned their analytic skills to the issues of deterrence in
intentional wrongs. 177 Judge Goldberg's application of such reasoning
represents an excellent example of how developing economic thinking
about legal issues can readily reach the courts. The more traditional legal
approach to punitive damages rests largely on theories of retribution and
on vague notions of deterrence. 17S Judge Goldberg's more refined (economic) analysis on the internalization of costs permits a more rigorous and
more accurate assessment of the role that punitive damages can serve.
The innovative use of economic reasoning in White Lake Improvement
Association v. Whitehall l79 illustrates how a court may independently embrace economic reasoning as a tool of its own. The court brings Coase's
transactions costs concept to bear on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The court held that although a nonprofit conservation association has
standing to bring an action to abate a private nuisance, the association
nonetheless must use the remedy provided by the administrative agency
having primary jurisdiction over the claim. ISO In its discussion, the court
applies economic reasoning to the primary jurisdiction issue-one that has
not been explicitly addressed by economists, and one that appears to have
no economic aspects calling for the use of economic reasoning.
The White Lake court concludes that the plaintiff must pursue its claim
administratively, but gives examples of situations in which the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction would not be appropriately invoked. The court states,
"[i]n another case it might appear that immediate equitable intervention is
necessary, that an administrative proceeding would not give the plaintiff
the relief to which he is entitled." lSI The footnote appended to this
sentence adds a transactions costs analysis:
Indeed, to the extent that allocation of clear water among
competing users is an economic problem, the optimal distribution
of this resource is discouraged by legal obstacles which distort the
175. See id. at 1238 (Goldberg,]., concurring). For further discussion of "true cost," see A.
AsIMAKOPULOS, supra note 23.
176. See 689 F.2d at 1238 (Goldberg,]., concurring).
177. See generally Becker, Crime and Punishment: An EcoTUlmic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal TradeojJBetween the Probability and Magnitude ofFines, 69
Al-I. ECON. REv. 880 (1979); Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal use of Nonmonetary Sanctions
as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232 (1985); Stigler, The optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J.
POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
178. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 11-12.
179.22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
180. See id. at 270, 177 N.W.2d at 476.
181. [d. at 283-84, 177 N.W.2d at 483 (footnote omitted).
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bidding process between recreational and industrial users. We
recognize that refusal of a court to entertain a case by invoking the
conc(~pt of primary jurisdiction may raise the cost to the citizen of
challtmging water pollution, and that adjustment of competing
public and private claims will be delayed or prevented altogether
if it becomes significantly less costly for industry to pollute waters
than for private citizens to restrain their pollution. For an analysis
of this problem of "transaction costs" see Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960).IS2
The court makes an accurate and finely tuned application of Coase's
thinking on the effects of transactions costs, with regard to an issue that
Coase did not address. IS3 The court extrapolates the true meaning behind
Coase's arguments divorced from any particular value judgment,IS4 and
utilizes it for an issue that, at least superficially, does not seem to have any
economic relevance. IS5
The White Lake analysis demonstrates how economic reasoning can be
m,eful for resolving legal problems that defy proper resolution by pure
legal analysis alone. While courts often note the hardships created by the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, they nevertheless feel compelled to apply
it. 186 The footnote in White Lake provides a way of recognizing how
invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine actually can work to deprive
parties of lielief to which they are entitled. IS? By tying the economic analysis
to the requirement that deference to an agency's primary jurisdiction is
necessary only if the party can receive an adequate remedy, the court
provides an economic basis for short-circuiting the primary jurisdiction
requirement. This marriage of law and economics creates a synergistic
effect, permitting the emergence of a more powerful tool for the resolution
of legal disputes.
In the cases discussed thus far, the courts have consciously used
economic analysis but did not discuss the implications of using it. In the
remaining cases the courts are more philosophical and analyze the usefulness and limitations of economic reasoning. Most courts explicitly recognize
that economic analysis does not compel value choices and that different
arguments, can support a variety of competing policy choices.
Dobson v. Camden IS8 perhaps best exemplifies this approach. The court
182. [d. at 283-84 n.32, 177 N.W.2d at 483 n.32 (last citation omitted).
183. Although the Coase Theorem may appear to act primarily in suppon of large
corporations, see supra text accompanying notes 73-74, the coun in White Lake uses the Coase
Theorem on behalf of private citizens in a suit against the large industrial interest.
184. Thus, from a neutral standpoint, the coun uses the Coase Theorem to come to a value
judgment im:olicidy favoring fair and equal access to the courts.
135. Although White Lake appears to be a typical nuisance case, in fact the case is a
procedural d(~cision on whether or not to require the exhaustion of all administrative remedies
before seeking judicial relief.
186. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1979) (hardship is no excuse for not invoking
agency's primary jurisdiction); see also C. WrJGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS
210-12 (3rd cd. 1976). For an understanding of the coun's authority on primary jurisdiction
at that time, l:ee White Lake, 22 Mich. App. at 280 n.27, 177 N.W.2d at 481 n.27.
187. See 22 Mich. App. at 283 n.32, 177 N.W.2d at 483 n.32.
188.705 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983).
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faced a choice between the "one-satisfaction" rule (the Texas rule concerning joint tortfeasors when one settles before trial)l89 and the policy of
deterrence in civil rights cases. In Dobson a restaurant manager had the
plaintiff arrested because the manager suspected that the plaintiff might
attempt to avoid paying his bill. While in jail, plaintiff was severely beaten
by police. The restaurant settled with plaintiff out of court before trial. The
police officers went to trial and, in addition to the restaurant, one of the
officers was held liable. The jury awarded total damages for the collective
harm caused by all joint tortfeasors in an amount less than the amount
already collected by plaintiff from the restaurant alone. The police officer
claimed he was not obliged to pay his share because plaintiff then would be
overcompensated. 190 The court frames the issue as one of competing
principles: compensation and deterrence. l9l The majority concludes that
the deterrence principle should predominate over the "one-satisfaction"
rule. 192 After making that policy decision, the majority then uses economic
analysis for two purposes. The first task, as in the Webster case,193 is to
demonstrate that the achievement of socially optimal deterrence requires
that the defendants pay the full costs of their misconduct. The second
purpose is to justify the court's decision to ignore the distributional impact
(i.e., the overcompensation of the plaintiff) by asserting that socially optimal
deterrence requires that result. Thus the court notes: "A potential
tortfeasor's action will probably not be shaped by considerations of whether
the injured party will be compensated nearly as much as they will be shaped
by considerations of whether the tOrtfeasor has to pay."194 Based on that
reasoning, the majority concludes that the police officer must pay his share
of the damages.
Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Dobson also uses economic reasoning,
but reaches a different conclusion. First, he argues that the police officer
need not actually pay the damages to promote deterrence. 195 The mere
threat alone, he says, would be sufficient deterrence and would not be
mitigated by a fortuitous settlement. 196 Second, while objecting to the use of
economic analysis at all, Judge Higginbotham further asserts that the
majority's application of it to support its deterrence rationale is flawed. In
his view, the police officer does not receive the benefits that society does
from more aggressive law enforcement, so forcing the police officer to
internalize the costs may lead to aless than optimal level oflaw enforcement. 197
189. The essence of the rule is that once the victim has been fully compensated for his
injuries by one or more tortfeasors, the remaining tortfeasors owe him nothing, no matter how
great their fault, absent punitive damages. Id. at 763.
190. See id. at 768-69.
191. See id. at 764.
192. See id. at 766.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 167-78.
194.705 F.2d at 770.
195. See id. at 772-73 (Higginbotham, j., dissenting).
196. See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). In fact, however, Justice Higginbotham's analysis
is not quite complete. If the police officer knows that there is a positive probability-no matter
how small-of not having to pay for the full consequences of his actions, his decisions will not
take into account the full true costs of his behavior.
197. See id. at 774-75 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Of course, one has to question how
much society benefits when aggressive law enforcement entails assaulting captive detainees.
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The dialogue on economic reasoning between the majority and the
dissent highlights the fact that economic reasoning is not determinative of
value choices. 19B The majority chooses deterrence of misconduct as a
primary goal, and utilizes economic reasoning to discover how to achieve
that end, i,e., it is necessary to make the defendant pay the full costs of the
harm produced. 199 The dissenter chooses instead to promote aggressive law
enforcement and also utilizes economic reasoning to determine how to
reach that goal, i.e., the threat of liability is sufficient deterrence and the
internalization of costs to the party not reaping the benefits is too
inhibiting. 20o Thus, Dobson illustrates a situation in which there are two
competing policies, each supported by a different economic argument. 201

198. See sllJ'Ta text accompanying note 123.
199. See 705 F.2d at 770.
200. See id. at 774-75 (Higginbotham, j., dissenting).
201. Madison Consulting Group v. South Carolina, 752 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1985),
represents the use of a single economic argument to show that the policy choice can go either
way. The majority concluded that Wisconsin could assert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident (orporation which had initiated a contract with plaintiff, the major portion of
which was to be performed in Wisconsin. See id. at 1195. In a separate opinion concurring in
the result, judge Swygert argued that a prior Seventh Circuit decision, which the majority
upheld but distinguished away, should be overruled. See id. at 1208 (Swygert,j., concurring in
the result). The prior decision held that a contractual obligation that causes a plaintiffs
5ub!.tantial performance to occur in the forum state is not itself sufficient to give the forum
state persona! jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. judge Swyg.;:rt wants to overrule
that standard Addressing the usual concerns for fairness to the defendant in such cases, he
ass('rts, "it is difficult to see how a sophisticated merchant who enters interstate commerce by
contracting With an out-of-State merchant can be a victim of fundamental unfairness by virtue
of the [out-of-State J court's decision to grant jurisdiction solely on the basis of that contract."
See U. at 1209 (Swygert,]., concurring). Observing that the primary effect of such a rule would
force the defmdant merchant to internalize the costs of possible litigation in a foreign state,
judge Swygert also recognizes that this economic argument "cuts both ways." See id. at n.7
(Swrgert,]., concurring). He observes that the opposite rule would foro~ the plaintiff instead
to internalize those costs. In fact, he notes, it would be equally burdensome to force either the
defendant or the plaintiff to internalize those costs. "[W]hile it is often stated that modern
economic de~elopments make it easier ... to defend suits in foreign States, these same
developments make it equally easy for the plaintiff to sue the defendant in defendant's home
forum." [d. (citations omitted). judge Swygert concludes that it would be equally fair to place
the burden on either party. "Absent any transaction costs, it would bejust ~ fair ... to force
the plaintiff, not the defendant, to internalize such costs." [d. (citing Coase's article for
support).
judge Swy~;ert goes on to argue that the doctrine defining the constitutional reach of
perwnaljurisdiction requires that the court fccus primarily on the fairness to thedeferulant. See
id. at 1210 n.7. Bllt if. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
("Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the
def('ndant, ""pile always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light
of other relevant factors ... "). Since it is not Ilnfair to place the burden on the defendant, judge
Swygert concludes that doing so cannot be a violation of due process. See 752 F.2d at 1210 n.7.
Thus,judg(' Swygert uses the economic argument relating to internalization of costs to assist
him in determining how to apply a legal doctrine on fundamental fairness. The legal doctrine
itself embodie:; a policy choice, one which focuses on fairness to the defendant rather than the
plaintiff. The ~conomic analysis guides implementation of that policy choice even though the
economic argument alone (without the policy choice) would support either conclusion.

ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON MAN

C.

625

Policy Choices in Efficiency Clothing: The False Conflict

Sometimes economic efficiency seems to compete with other policy
considerations. The courts may appear to reject economic efficiency as a
policy choice. This appearance is deceiving. Economic analysis seeks to
discern the different economically efficient states that potentially can be
achieved. Once the policymaker selects a particular state, economic reasoning then can be used to determine how to reach that choice as efficiendy as
possible.202 Economic efficiency is inextricably tied to economic analysis
and therefore a rejection of economic efficiency is in reality a rejection of
economic reasoning. However, since economic reasoning is merely an
analytical methodology for discovering choices and how best to achieve
them, it cannot be rejected as a moral choice. When the courts believe they
are rejecting a policy of economic efficiency, they are, in fact, rejecting a
particular social choice or value that either explicidy or implicidy underlies
that policy.
Excellent examples of this phenomenon include City of Flagstaff v.
Atchinson, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway (Atchinson)203 and District of Columbia
v. Air Florida. 204 In both cases a municipality brought suit against a
tortfeasor to recoup the expenses for rescue and cleanup operations
following a catastrophic accident.205 Both courts rejected the municipalities'
claims for damages on the ground that the legislature in each municipality
had determined that the costs of these accidents were to be borne by the
cities.206 The municipalities' claims in effect attack economic or fiscal
legislation, and therefore the courts used low level rational basis scrutiny.207
Because the legislative decision to make the city bear the costs is a rational
one, each court concluded that even if it could be shown that the tortfeasor

202. The analysis in Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 188-201, illustrates this principle well.
203.719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).
204.750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
205. The Atchison case arose from the derailment of a train carrying liquid petroleum gas.
The accident required the city to evacuate its residents as far as a mile away. See 719 F.2d at
323. The Air Florida case resulted from the crash of a passenger jet into the Potomac River near
the Washington D.C. area. See 750 F.2d at 1078. In Atchison, the damages amounted to nearly
$42,000 and in Air Florida the damages exceeded $750,000.
206. See Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1080 ("It is critically important to recognize that the
government's decision to provide tax-supported services is a legislative policy determination."); Atchison, 719 F.2d at 324 ("If the government has chosen to bear the cost for reasons
of economic efficiency, or even as a subsidy to the citizens and their business, the decision
implicates fiscal policy; the legislature and its public deliberative processes, rather than the
court, is the appropriate forum to address such fiscal concerns."). The Air Florida court
explicitly adopted the reasoning and rule of Atchison, see 750 F.2d at 1080; hence further
references will be made to the Atchison case only.
207. When the Atchison court concludes that the city's allocation of the emergency cost is
"neither irrational nor unfair," they seem to refer to the constitutional level ofjudicial scrutiny
to be applied when the issue is an economic one. See 719 F.2d at 323. See generally 2 R.

J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 18.3, at 330 (1986) (rational basis test used to review laws or regulations challenged under

ROTUNDA,

due process or equal protection guarantees unless "fundamental constitutional right, suspect
classification or the characteristics of alienage, sex or legitimacy" involved).
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and not the city was the "more efficient cost avoider," the burden could not
be shifted to the tortfeasor. 208
On the surface each court appears to reject economic efficiency in
favor of rationality scrutiny. Indeed, it appears that each court rejects
economic efficiency because it conflicts with a principle oflaw. But a closer
examination of these opinions reveals that a more subtle choice being
made, one that involves a selection from competing values rather than
different methods of analysis.
The Atchinson court says that even if it possessed the necessary
information to assign liability to the more efficient cost avoider, and if that
assignment differed from the legislature's choice, the court would not shift
the burden to that more efficient cost avoider. 209 Implicit in the court's
statement regarding "information to determine the most efficient costavoider" lurks the notion of an objective measure that can assess the utility
to society of burdening one party as opposed to the other. There are
different effects, however, from placing the cleanup burden on one party
or the other. For example, if the municipality pays for cleanup, it can
spread the risk of cost by taxation of its citizens. On the other hand, if the
common carrier bears the responsibility, the effect is to motivate accident
deterrence and risk spreading through higher fees for customer services.
There is no objective measure by which to compare these effects. Valuing
one effect over the other is a value choice, one which is necessarily
subjective.
Presumably, the courts' discussion of the information that would
determine the most efficient cost avoider contemplates using market prices
to do so. Therefore, the court must believe that the market prices provide
an objective valuation of the effects of choices. Using market prices as a
means of making the comparison, however, is not objective. The choice of
market prices is itself a value decision to use society's current expression in
the mark,etplace. 210 Thus, when a court refuses to change the burden
because to do so differs from the legislature's choice, the court believes it is
potentially rejecting the economically efficient choice, when in fact it is not.
The court is actually rejecting the value choice implicit in the market's
comparison of the two effects and does so in deference to the legislature's
evaluation of the competing liability assignments. The legislature may have
decided, for example, to place more value on the benefits of subsidization
of business in the city in order to stimulate the city'S economic growth. 211 In
deferring to the legislature's evaluation the court implicitly complies with
the operative rule of law requiring the judiciary to leave rational legislative
decisions undisturbed. 212

208. See 719 F.2d at 323-24.
209. See id.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
211. Cf. 719 F.2d at 324.
212. Like the courts in Atchinson and Air Florida, the court in Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United
States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), appears to reject economic efficiency in favor of a rule of
law. In Bushey, a dry dock owner sued the government (as shipowner) for recovery of damages
done to the Qry dock by a government employee. While the Coast Guard ship was in dry dock,
employees slept on board. One evening, an employee returned to the ship inebriated and
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opened the dry dock valves, causing the ship to list to the side and do substantial damage to
the dry dock. See id. at 168. The court addresses whether liability should be assigned on the
basis of who is the least expensive accident avoider or on the more traditional grounds of
respondeat superior. See id. at 170-71. The court notes that the dry dock owner was probably
the least expensive accident avoider, see id. at 170 n.7, but decides to assign liability to the
government because its employee's behavior was reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of
the doctrine of respondeat superior, see id. at 171-72. Thus, the court appears to reject
economic efficiency in favor of an operative rule of law. Again, this is not true. The court
merely chooses one policy value over another. In this case it favors the fairness values inherent
in respondeat superior over the values served by reducing the risk of accidents. This is not so
bald a choice since respondeat superior contains its own aspects of risk reduction. It creates an
incentive for the employer to scrutinize prospective employees for propensities toward safe
and responsible behavior. The Bushey court, however, questions the efficacy of such incentives.
See id. at 170.
Though this choice appears to contradict what economic efficiency would dictate (i.e.,
assigning liability to reduce accidents most efficiently), that is a misperception. Economic
efficiency analysis does not select accident reduction over respondeat superior principles;
economic efficiency analysis merely indicates which party to hold liable if society wants a policy
of accident reduction. The absence of efficiency considerations with respect to the respondeat
superior doctrine does not imply that economic efficiency analysis rejects the doctrine.
Respondeat superior is a valid policy alternative to accident reduction. It does not lose validity
simply because it does not call for economic reasoning. Thus, the court erroneously infers that
its choice of respondeat superior rejects economic efficiency analysis. The choice does not
reject economic efficiency, it rejects the policy of accident reduction.
In Bushey, Air Florida, and Atchinson, the courts appear to reject economic efficiency when it
is in competition with other policies or legal rules. In Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 105
Idaho 320, 669 P.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 108 Idaho 602,701 P.2d 222 (1985), the court
seems to do the opposite, that is, it appears to reject an alternative legal principle in favor of
economic efficiency when the two are in direct conflict. Double R involved homeowners who
brought suit for damages and injunctive relief against a feedlot alleging that the feedlot's
expansion had created a nuisance. See 105 Idaho at 321-22, 669 P.2d at 644-45. The Idaho
Court of Appeals questioned whether to adopt § 826 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides that injunctive relief can be granted. only if the gravity of the harm outweighs the
utility of the actor's conduct. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1977). However, if
the harm is serious but does not outweigh the utility, then the plaintiff is limited to receiving
compensatory damages unless the award of such damages itself would cause the defendant
business to fail. In that situation, the damages will be for less than full compensation. See id.
§ 826(b). The court notes that the Restatement's guidelines arguably effect a form of private
eminent domain in certain situtations. See 105 Idaho at 331,669 P.2d at 654. The Restatement's
injunctive and damages remedies accommodate the objective of economic efficiency by
allowing an enterprise to continue to operate if its value to society exceeds its harm. See id. at
334, 669 P.2d at 656-57. But the Restatement also promotes distributive justice by allowing
compensation to the individuals harmed by such activities. These goals, however, conflict
when full compensation to harmed individuals would terminate a business whose productivity
value exceeds the value of the harm. In that case, the Restatement permits the firm to stay in
business without having to pay full compensation. See id., 669 P.2d at 657. In spite of this
distributional inequity, the court adopts the Restatement view. It thus appears that the court
chooses economic efficiency over distributional justice. In reality, the court implicitly decides
to adopt the value choices underlying the Restatement's provisions on injunctive and damage
remedies. The value choice implicit in the Restatement is the notion that when an enterprise's
utility to society (the assessment of which, in itself, is a value choice made by decisionmakers)
exceeds the harm (again, the measure of which is determined by a value choice), there will be
a redistribution in the form of denying injunctive or full damage relief.
Some might view this decision as a choice of economic efficiency because it appears to be the
result of a straightforward cost benefit analysis, but it is not. The court has to evaluate the
effects of its decision on each of the disputing parties. In determining the weight to be given
these effects, the court must make a comparative evaluation which of necessity incorporates
subjective factors. On the surface, the court, by adopting the Restatement view, apparently
adopts a policy similar to Coase and Posner. The decision not to award full compensation
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The Fallacy and Pitfalls of "Economic Determinism"

The final two cases illustrate the importance of clearly articulating the
distinction between social policies and economic efficiency analysis. Because economic efficiency cannot operate without a value choice, every
economic efficiency argument implicitly or explicitly embodies a value
choice dt:termined by the individual making the argument. 213 The failure
to make the choice explicit merely means that a disguised value choice is
made in the name of economic efficiency, one that may not be consistent
with current societal goals. Calling the value decision "economic efficiency"
creates false or misleading choices that might not be made if the policy
decision proffered were explicit. In other words, it thwarts meaningful
comparison between competing policies. A decisionmaker might give up an
important societal goal, believing that economic efficiency requires it; that
decision maker might not do so if the true value choice underlying the
economic efficiency argument were understood. On the other hand, a
decisionmaker seeking to disguise a value choice that might othen"ise be
unpalatable may accomplish that goal simply by couching it as a purely
economic efficiency argument. Both decisionmakers commit the fallacy of
economic determinism; that is, they proceed as if economic arguments were
a neutral policy value.
Jud~;e Posner's writings exemplify this confusion between economic
efficiency analysis and policy choices. Both in United States Fidelity c..<?
Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba,214 which he appears to decide on purely economic
efficiency grounds, and in his commentary215 on the opinion in Union Oil v.
Oppen,216 which he criticizes for bad economic reasoning, Judge Posner
when a productive finn may be put out of business certainly seems analogous to Coase':;
railroad scenario, which pennits the railroad to cast sparks onto adjacent landowners' property
without paying compensation for the damage. See supra note 51 and text accompanying notes
40-51. However, the Double R court's approach differs because the decisionmaker is not
CClnfined to the use of market prices to assess relative hanns and benefits. The court notes that
factor~ such as "personal health and safety" as well as "fundamental freedom of action within
the boundaJies of ... [one's] own property" play an integral role in measuring the gravity of
the harm for purposes of the § 826 balancing test and that these factors ordinarily would favor
the granting; of injunctive relief. See 105 Idaho at 331-32, 669 P.2d at 654. The court further
sUI~gests that for those few cases in which injunctive relief under the Restatement would not
lit-notwithstanding the invasion of health, safety, and fundamental freedom-injunctive
relief ~till might be available. The court states that its adoption of the Restatement's test for
nuisance "stops short of being absolute." See id. at 332, 669 P.2d at 654-55. This tilt toward
concern for distributive justice reflects Coase's caveat that broader sodal dimensions should
enter the solution of economic problems. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. However,
the Double R court looks beyond Coase's generalities and articulates specifi: factors relevant to
achieving those goals and how they will affect the outcomes of such disputes.
The Idaho Supreme Court rejects the lower court's application of the Restatement, substituting a CO;lsian-styled argument which immunizes a nuisance source from liability if the
utility of thl~ source's conduct is in "the interests of the community." See 108 Idaho 602,
607-08, 701 P.2d 222, 227-28. One dissenting justice particularly emphasizes the need to
spread the C)sts of nuisance by internalizing them in the price of the source's product. See id.
at 610,701 P.2d at 230 (Bistline,J., dissenting).
213. See slIpra note 122 and accompanying text.
214.683 r.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982).
215. Posn('r, Some Uses and Abuses ofEconomics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 297-301 (1979).
216.501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
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reveals that he himself is subject to making value choices, albeit subtle ones,
in the name of economic efficiency.
In Plovidba a longshoreman fell to his death aboard ship after he
entered a darkened hold in which a hatch was open. 217 Although his crew
was working in the adjacent hold, the longshoreman had no authority to be
in the darkened one. 218 The complaint alleged that the shipowner negligently failed to erect barriers or post warnings of danger across the open
entryway separating the two holds. 219
Judge Posner applied the Learned Hand negligence formula 220 to
decide Plovidba. This formula weighs the cost (labeled B) to the defendant
of taking measures to avoid the accident against the "expected harm." The
"expected harm" is defined as the actual harm that might occur (L)
multiplied by the probability (P) that it will occur, given the failure to take
precautionary measures. 221 If the cost of the precautionary measures is less
than the expected harm, then the failure to take those measures constitutes
negligence. 222 Algebraically, this is written as: failure to take precautionary
measures is negligence when B < P * L (where "<" means "less than" and
"*,, means "multiplied by").
In Plovidba, L is high (L equals the loss of life) and B is low (the cost to
the shipowner of posting warning signs or barriers in entryways to
darkened holds). Judge Posner must find P (the probability of future harm)
very small if he wishes to avoid assigning liability to the shipowner. 223 In his
probability analysis, Posner makes three behavioral assumptions. First, the
decedent returned to the darkened hold to steal. Second, this behavior in
longshoremen is aberrant. 224 Third, Posner assumes (without stating) that
longshoremen and shipowners are in equal bargaining positions. This
assumption is essential for his market analysis that concludes that the
shipowner's decision not to undertake any precautions was proof in itself
that the decision was not negligent. 225 Although some evidence supported
217. Each hold has several vertical levels, each of which is separated from the level above by
a hatch. When the hatch is closed it becomes the floor the longshoremen walk upon while
loading cargo onto that level. When the hatch is open, the level below is accessible for loading.
In Plovidba, when the hold was completely loaded, the shipowner left the hold dark and all but
the top hatch open. The decedent entered the hold and fell to his death through the open
hatches. See 683 F.2d at 1023.
218. See id. at 1028.
219. See id. at 1024.
220. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), in which Judge
Learned Hand first articulated his famous economic balancing test.
221. Since the probability of an accident occurring is always less than 1, the value of the
"expected harm," that is, the value of the harm multiplied by its probability, is always less than
the value of the harm if it actually occurred. The degree to which the expected harm is less
than the actual harm depends on the probability of the accident occurring. The smaller the
probability is (or is perceived to be), the smaller the calculation of the expected harm is relative
to the actual harm when it is applied in the Learned Hand formula.
222. See 159 F.2d at 173.
223. See 683 F.2d at 1027-28.
224. See id. at 1028.
225. Judge Posner argues that when the shipowner makes a decision whether to undertake
the burdens of avoiding a specific risk of harm to longshoremen, the shipowner is faced with
two choices. He must either take action to avoid the risk of harm or, in response to market
forces, compensate the longshoremen for the increased risk of expected harm that results
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the assumption that the longshoreman was stealing,226 little evidence
supported the belief that the probability of theft was so small as to be
negligible. 227 No evidence supported the validity of Posner's implicit
assumption of equal bargaining power between the longshoremen and the
shipowner. 228
Presumably, Judge Posner chose the Learned Hand formula to
achieve tl:.e appearance of ne~tral economic reasoning. The formula is a
paradigm of cost-benefit analysis, a type of economic reasoning frequently
applied to policy questions. 229 In Judge Posner's discussion of efforts by
other courts to grapple with negligence standards, he implies that their
analyses are mired in confusion.230 Judge Posner offers the Learned Hand
formula as "a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are
relevant to a judgment of negligence and about the relationship among
those factors."231
In fa,:t, the cost-benefit approach in general and the Learned Hand
formula in particular are not the dispassionate inquiry into the "relevant
factors" that Judge Posner suggests. In applying the formula he had to
make a number of assumptions that are in fact value choices. 232 In addition,
the choice of the formula implies a value choice since the Learned Hand
formula is only one available means for assessing negligence in order to
determine accident liability. The courts use a variety of approaches to
determine third party negligence: the foreseeable harm analysis,233 a policy
of accident minimization,234 and assignment of liability to the least-cost
accident avoider.235
The least-cost accident avoider approach seeks to avoid accidents at
from not doing so. If the costs of avoiding the hann are greater than the cost of the increased
compensation, the shipowner will prefer to pay the increased wages. If the costs of avoiding
the harm are less, then the shipowner will choose instead to undertake the precautionary
measures. Judge Posner argues that since the shipowner in Plovidba chose not to undertake the
precautions, the costs of doing so must have exceeded the cost of the increased wages and
therefore the expected hann. Since the cost of the precautionary measures (B) exceeded the
e:_pected harm (P~'L), Judge Posner concludes that under the Learned Hand fonnula the
shipowner is not to be found negligent. See id. at 1029. But see infra note 228 and accompanying
text (describing problems underlying Posner's analysis).
226. See id. at 1028.
227.Judge Posner asserts that the probability that a longshoreman would steal is so
infinite~imalll small that it need not be taken into consideration by the shipowner. However,
the Author's casual survey of colleagues returning from Europe whose shipped automobiles
invariably anive with their radios missing suggests that Judge Posner's assessment of the
probability of the occurrence of certain characteristics is unrealistic. Cf Ira S. Bushey & Sons,
Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Gir. 1968) (discussing employer's need to consider
characteristic; of seamen and risks of injury inherent in working environment).
228. Judge Posner's argument presupposes that the longshoreman and the shipowner hold
roughly equal bargaining positions; that is, it presupposes that the longshoreman can
effectively ne.Jotiate for higher wages to compensate for the increased hann. This is a highly
suspect assumption for which Judge Posner provides no evidentiary support.
229. See ger.·eraily G. GoETZ, GASE.S AND MATERIALS ON LAw AND ECONOMICS 292-374 (1983).
230. See 68:3 F.2d at 1025.
231. See id. at 1026.
232. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying te.xt.
233. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Gir. 1968).
234. See Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 475, 478 (9th Gir.' 1980).
235. See Bu.;hey, 398 F.2d at 170-71.
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the least cost to society by combining a policy of accident minimization with
cost-benefit analysis. 236 It assigns liability to the party who can more
cheaply avoid the accident. The approach represents an effort to sustain
incentives to keep accidents down. 237 If Judge Posner had chosen the
economic approach ofleast-cost accident avoidance, the choice likely would
have altered the outcome of Plovidba. Since the shipowner's cost of erecting
barriers to prevent entry (such as locked doors) is trivial compared with the
cost to the stevedore of providing equal assurance (for example, through
increased security staff) that no longshoremen will wander into unseen
dangers, the shipowner would be found liable. 238 Thus Judge Posner's
economic approach to negligence is not unique; other equally economically
efficient approaches to determining negligence exist. The approaches
differ not in the degree of economic efficiency but, as demonstrated in the
Plovidba case, in the identity of the party who bears the costs of the risk of
harm (the shipowner or the longshoreman).
Clearly, Judge Posner's use of the Learned Hand formula does not
lead to an economically determinative judgment. To the contrary, it can be
seen once more how efficiency analysis can support opposite conclusions;
the value choice made initially determines what conclusion will be reached.
In determining the test for negligence, any legal standard incorporating
economic efficiency also must embody the value choice of who is to bear the
risk ofharm. 239 The value choices implicit in the economic argument must
be unmasked if the courts are to make informed choices.
Posner's criticism240 of Union Oil Co. v. Oppen 241 forcefully drives home
the dangers stemming from the fallacy of economic determinism, and the
importance of distinguishing between value choices and economic reasoning. Posner frames his criticism as an objective evaluation of the powers of
236. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 159, at 35-129.
237. See Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 677,
688-93 (1985); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,2-3,7-8 (1980).
238. This is not to say that the least-cost accident avoider approach would lead to a different
efficient outcome. Both under the least-cost accident avoider doctrine and the Learned Hand
formula, the shipowner would still face the same economic decision, to wit, whether to
undertake the burden of avoiding the accident or to pay for the expected harm (either through
higher wages or through liability in the event of an accident). If the cost of the burden e.xceeds
the expected harm, the shipowner will choose not to undertake the burden under either
policy. If the Learned Hand formula applies, the shipowner will choose not to undertake the
burden because he will be found not negligent and therefore not liable. Under the least-cost
accident avoider theory, the shipowner will still not undertake the burden because even though
he is still liable for the harm, the expected costs for such liability is less than the costs of the
burden. Thus, under either policy, the shipowner will make the same economic efficiency
decision with respect to avoiding the harm. The only difference between the two policies is
whether, if the accident occurs, the shipowner pays for the harm.
239. For example, the value embodied in the Learned Hand formula (as applied in Plovidba)
incorporates the decision to hold the shipowner free of liability if an economically efficient
choice is made concerning the level of risk to which the shipowner exposes the plaintiff. See
Plovidba, 683 F.2d at 1026. On the other hand, the least-cost accident avoider approach, which
seeks to maintain incentives to further reduce the risk of accidents, assigns liability to the
shipowner even if it chooses to expose plaintiff to an economically efficient level of risk. See
supra note 238.
240. Posner, supra note 215, at 297-301.
241. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
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economic reasoning of the opinion's author, Judge Sneed. In fact, close
examination uncovers the value conflict that forms the core of the disagreement between Posner's and Sneed's approaches.
In Union Oil a spill by the oil company destroyed much aquatic life off
the Sant2l Barbara coast and thereby seriously reduced the expected future
income of commercial fishermen. Plaintiffs sought recovery for the loss of
a prospective economic advantage. 242 The defendants argued that this
form of recovery would subject them to unforeseeable claims based on
remote and speculative injuries.243 The court imposed liability based on
principles of admiralty law244 (fishermen are special seamen and have the
right to r,~cover future economic losses) and on the ground of foreseeability
of the risk of pollution to the environment.245
Although the court rests its decision on legal principles, Judge Sneed
turns to economic analysis to buttress the panel's decision. He cites both
Calabresi and Coase to support his argument that tort liability should be
assigned so as to achieve, as closely as possible, the optimal allocation of
resource~. Judge Sneed characterizes this optimum as the one achieved by
"a perfect market system." That economic approach "requires the court to
fix the identity of the party who can avoid the costs most cheaply. Once
fixed, this determination then controls liability."246
JudUe Sneed apparendy believes that a single economically efficient
allocation of resources exists, and that the least-cost accident avoider
approach brings society closest to that allocation. His opinion serves to
indicate how strong the impression is among jurists that only one optimal
allocation of resources exists and that it is economically determinative. But,
as previously discussed, more than one economically efficient choice exists,
each embodying different value choices. 247 Judge Sneed's choice of the
least-cost accident avoider approach emphasizes the value of minimizing
the prob~.bility of accidents. An alternative choice might have been a policy
that encourages oil exploration and development. In that case, an economically efficient policy permits plaintiffs to recover only if they could
demonstrate that defendant did not take prudent care, an analysis reminiscent c.f the Learned Hand approach248 or the Coase-Posner total
product rule. 249 This is not to suggest that Judge Sneed's approach is more
or less Freferable. Rather, the observation serves as a reminder that
different value choices exist, that Judge Sneed made one, and in fact had to
make one before he could apply economic efficiency analysis to implement
it.
Recognition that different policies often call for different economic
reasoning; and remedies provides for a better understanding ofJudge (then
242. See id. at 563.
243. See id.; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 1008 (discussing general
principle thlt denies damages for loss of prospective economic advantage).
244. See 501 F.2d at 567.
245. See UI. at 568-69.
246. See UI. at 569.
247. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 37-57.
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Professor) Posner's somewhat acerbic commentary on Union Oil in a law
review article. 250 While Posner's analysis of Judge Sneed's opinion is
couched as criticism of Judge Sneed's economic reasoning powers,251 what
Posner really disagrees with are Judge Sneed's value choices.252 For
example, Judge Sneed does not want to assign liability to "such groups as
consumers of staple groceries" who are not involved with eitller oil or fish
production. 253 Posner finds the concern confusing and the justification
obscure. Posner notes that "there is no tort mechanism by which the
manufacturers, sellers, or consumers of staple groceries could be made to
bear the costs of the Santa Barbara oil spill."254 Posner confesses that he
does not understand how imposing liability on defendants will still impose
some costs on these groupS.255
Judge Sneed obviously recognizes that the Union Oil situation really
involves three groups: the plaintiffs, the defendants, and the rest of society
that may draw pleasure from the Santa Barbara coast. The court wishes to
avoid "assigning liability" to the third group, because the members of that
group cannot assist in avoiding the accident but nonetheless will bear some
of the accident's costs. 256 Posner fails to see that not assigning liability to one
party effectively assigns liability to the others. If the defendants escape full
liability, then by default the rest of society bears the costs of the accident.
This holds true whether plaintiffs and the rest of society explicitly bear the
costs by paying higher taxes to repair the damage,257 or whether they bear
the costs implicitly through the loss of the use of the Santa Barbara Channel
and beaches. Judge Sneed correctly perceives that the outcome of Union Oil
does not prevent the rest of society from bearing part of the loss, because
the action involves only the compensation of fishermen for forgone
profits.258 Whatever pleasure third parties have lost, such as pleasant
beaches and clean swimming areas, goes uncompensated. Thus, Judge
Sneed expresses the court's value choice: the minimization of costs that·the
rest of society will have to bear.
Posner also objects, on the grounds of unsound economic reasoning,259 to the court's justification that "the loss should be allocated to that
party who can best correct any error in allocation . . . by acquiring the
activity to which the party has been made liable."260 His objection is
particularly interesting because the court's statement represents reasoning
which is in fact quite sound but that advocates a policy prescription in direct
250. See Posner, supra note 215, at 297-301.
251. See id. at 297.
252. Notably,Judge Posner states that he concurs with Judge Sneed's result even though not
with Judge Sneed's analysis. See id. at 300. As will become apparent, Posner's statement does
not diminish my critique here.
253. See Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 569-70.
254. See Posner, supra note 215, at 299.
255. See id. at 299-300.
256. See 501 F.2d at 570.
257. Not unlike the choice to have municipal taxpayers bear the cost for rescue and clean-up
of catastrophic accidents. See supra text accompanying notes 206-12.
258. See 501 F.2d at 570.
259. See Posner, supra note 215, at 300.
260. See 501 F.2d. at 570.
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opposition to Posner's own (i.e., his version of the total product rule).261
Recall the discussion of Coase's railroad allegory which addressed the
economic efficiency issues of the railroad buying the farmer's land. The
economically efficient outcome dictates that the harming party compensate
the harmt'd party for the losses incurred. Efficiency, however, also requires
that lossell be minimized. In the railroad example, minimizing the losses
means that the farmers do not employ society's resources to produce crops
that would be destroyed anyway. Optimally the farmers should not plant
crops and the railroad should have to compensate the farmers only for their
forgone profits. The present value of the forgone profits over time
determint·s the value of the land. Thus, purchasing the land from the
farmer is the economic equivalent of the railroad compensating the farmer
for forgone profits in every time period.262
Clearly, purchasing the land falls into the category of "buying out" the
other party. At least in a commercial context, the party who earns the
greatest profit from a resource is the one who will find it more useful. Being
the more profitable user, the party also is more capable of buying the right.
The question is whether this justifies assigning the liability (and not the
right) to the party more capable of buying it anyway. Once the problem is
distilled in this fashion, it is easy to recognize that Posner already expressed
his opinion on this issue. He believes that the right (and not the liability)
should be assigned to the party who would have purchased the right
anyway.263 His justification is that this ensures that the party who will use
the right more efficiently will have it. 264 Relying on Calabresi,265 Judge
Sneed chooses an opposite rule, that is, to assign the liability (and not the
right) to the party who would have purchased the right. 266 This choice is
equally valid from an economic standpoint because (in the presence of
transactions costs) that party is just as likely to ultimately use the right as
efficiently (through purchase) as it will when assigned the right. 267 The
choice between the two is one of wealth distribution and equity, not
economic efficiency.268 The ultimate question in this case is who will own
and control the value of the environment, not how to use it efficiently.
Posner's policy prescription would dictate that the oil companies own and
control the environment. Judge Sneed's court clearly supports different
distributional values: "[T]he public's deep disapproval of injuries to the
environment and the strong policy of preventing such injuries, all point to
the existence of a required duty."269 Though Posner may have problems
understanding the economic reasoning of the Union Oil court, his critique
stems ultimately from his basic disagreement with economic reasoning
processes that proceed from value premises that are different from his own.
261. See st;pra text accompanying notes 52-58.
262. See st;pra text accompanying notes 78-8l.
263. R. PC'SNER, supra note 10, at 45.
264. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The merits of this position have been
dir.cussed in the previous section. See supra text accompanying notes 58-102.
265. G. Cr.LABRESI, supra note 159, at 69-73.
266. See 501 F.2d at 570.
267. See st;pra notes 61, 83 and accompanying text.
268. See 501 F.2d at 569.
269. See id.
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CONCLUSION

This Article contains an examination of the role that economic analysis
can play in assisting the judicial process. Economic analysis is a reasoning
tool that can assist in, but is separate from, the process of making value
choices. Not only can economic reasoning reveal policy choices, both of an
economic and noneconomic dimension, but it also can help advance
selected policy goals more effectively. Thus, economic analysis does not,
and indeed cannot, dictate policy choices.
As a springboard to demonstrate the truth of these assertions, this
Article scrutinizes a policy recommendation that has gained widespread
attention both in the scholarly and judicial arenas. This approach, referred
to here as the Coase-Posner total product rule, claims to select resolutions
to disputes that are economically dictated. This Article analyzes the
Coase-Posner total product rule in two contexts. On one level, a careful
economic analysis shows that the policy does not in fact promote economic
efficiency as its proponents maintain. In addition, a functional analysis of
the total product rule indicates that the rule masks a value system rather
than providing the unbiased approach to dispute resolution that its authors
claim. A legal-economic analysis of cases citing Coase demonstrates that
most courts intuitively use economic reasoning properly: to discern and
effectuate policy choices. This exposition affirms for the legal community
that economic analysis can be a useful tool-one that need not be steeped
in any particular value system that the potential user does not share.

